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IV. THE FUTURE OF LOBBYIST REGULATIONS....................160

I.

CONCERNS ABOUT LOBBYING

Widespread concerns1 about the influence of lobbyists have been
addressed only half-heartedly through legal regulation. At the federal,2
state,3 and local4 levels of American government, numerous rules have
1
See, e.g., Editorial, Lobby Reform Lite, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at A20
(“[An] easy money, quid pro quo culture . . . now bedevils the Capitol. . . . [L]egislators
shameless[ly] use . . . executive jets . . . eagerly offered by corporate officials bent on
insider access. . . . [T]he people’s representatives blatantly designate lobbyists to head
their fund-raising teams.”). Disturbing reports about the influence of lobbyists are
common. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Vague Law and Hard Lobbying Add Up to
Billions for Big Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, at A1 (explaining how lobbyists turned a
“supposedly cost-free incentive . . . [into a] multibillion-dollar break for an industry
making record profits”).
2
See Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601–12 (West 2005); see
also CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY’S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 692 (5th ed. 2000) [hereinafter
GUIDE TO CONGRESS] (“The first comprehensive lobbying law was enacted in 1946, and .
. . there have been other piecemeal changes since then . . . .”); id. at 716–23 (discussing
the history of federal lobbying regulations). See generally William H. Minor & Karen A.
Regan, Federal, in LOBBYING, PACS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE: 50 STATE HANDBOOK §§
10.1–10.42 (Peter C. Christianson et al. eds., 2003) (summarizing federal lobbying laws);
KARL SCHRIFTGIESSER, THE LOBBYISTS: THE ART AND BUSINESS OF INFLUENCING
LAWMAKERS (1951) (explaining why the Lobbying Act of 1946 “was so long in coming .
. . [and] how it was finally passed”).
3
Lobbying “has always existed in state legislatures, often more corruptly and
brazenly than in Washington.” SCHRIFTGIESSER, supra note 2, at 260. By 1951, “thirtyeight states and Alaska regulate[d] lobbies by law other than those laws forbidding
bribery.” Id. Today, every “state in the union . . . has enacted legislation regulating the
conduct of those who ‘lobby’ the state’s legislative or executive officials.” Florida
League of Prof’l Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 458 (11th Cir. 1996) (footnote
omitted). Many states have requirements similar to the federal lobbyist registration
requirements, and “the trend at both the national and state levels is for greater disclosure
and tighter oversight of lobbying activities.” William P. Horn, Introduction to the
Legislative Process, in THE LEGISLATIVE LABYRINTH: A MAP FOR NOT-FOR PROFITS 51
(Walter P. Pidgeon, Jr., ed., 2001). “State lobby laws generally apply to the state
legislature, the executive branch (including state agencies), or both.” Chip Nielsen et al.,
State Lobby and Gift Laws, in CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 2005: COMPLYING WITH
CAMPAIGN FINANCING, LOBBYING & ETHICS LAWS 663 (Jan Witold Baran, et al. eds.,
2005) (emphasis omitted). See generally LOBBYING, PACS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE: 50
STATE HANDBOOK (Peter C. Christianson et al. eds., 2003) (setting forth, state-by-state,
registration rules, reporting requirements, and prohibited activities).
4
Some states, such as Georgia, Minnesota and New York, “regulate and require
statewide reporting of attempts to influence action by local legislative bodies (such as
city councils) and administrative agencies.” Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 665. Most
states, however, leave local lobby regulation to local governments.” Id. at 663.
Furthermore, “[m]any major municipal and regional governments separately regulate
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been adopted to govern the conduct of lobbyists. Yet, many of those laws
are so weak5 or incomplete6 that they do little to advance the cause of
good government.7 Even the reforms recently passed by Congress8 are
said by lobbyists to contain “ample loopholes for those seeking to buy
access to lawmakers, mainly through campaign fund-raising.”9
lobbying.” Id. at 665. For examples of codes in major cities that specifically regulate
lobbyists, see AUSTIN, TEX., AUSTIN CITY CODE §§ 4-8-1 to -11 (2006), available at
http://www.amlegal.com (follow “library” hyperlink; then follow “Texas” hyperlink; then
follow “Austin(Code)” hyperlink; then follow “Frames” hyperlink; then follow “Chapter
4. Business Regulation and Permit Requirements” hyperlink; then follow “4–8”
hyperlink); DALLAS, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS §§ 12A-1 to -43 (2006), available at
http://www.amlegal.com (follow “library” hyperlink; then follow “Texas” hyperlink; then
follow “Dallas” hyperlink; then follow “Frames” hyperlink; then expand “More” folder;
then follow “Chapter 12A” hyperlink); MIAMI, FLA., CHARTER AND CODE OF THE CITY OF
MIAMI, §§ 2-651 to -658 (2006), available at http://www.municode.com (follow “Online
Library” hyperlink; then follow “Florida” hyperlink; then follow “Miami” hyperlink; then
follow “Miami Code of Ordinances” hyperlink; then expand “Chapter 2
ADMINISTRATION” folder; then expand “Article VI. LOBBYISTS” folder); SAN
ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO §§ 2-62 to -71 (2006),
available at http://www.sanantonio.gov/atty/Ethics/codetext.htm (setting forth a detailed
regime of lobbyist prohibitions and disclosure requirements); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.,
CAMPAIGN AND GOVERNMENTAL CONDUCT CODE §§ 2.100 to 2.160 (2006), available at
http://www.municode.com (follow “Online Library” hyperlink; then follow “California”
hyperlink; then follow “San Francisco” hyperlink; then follow “San Francisco Campaign
and Governmental Conduct Code” hyperlink); SAN JOSE, CAL., SAN JOSÉ MUNICIPAL
CODE § 12.12.010 to .12.550 (2006), available at http://www.amlegal.com (follow
“library” hyperlink; then follow “California” hyperlink; then follow “San Jose”
hyperlink; then follow “Frames” hyperlink; then expand “Title 12. ETHICS
PROVISIONS” folder).
5
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-1492(4)–(5) (LexisNexis 2002)
(identifying “practices which reflect discredit on the practice of lobbying or on the
Legislature” as Class III misdemeanors); MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-7-302 (2005) (“No
lobbyist or principal shall engage in or directly or indirectly authorize any unprofessional
conduct.”).
6
See, e.g., Kathryn L. Plemmons, “Lobbying Activities” and Presidential Pardons:
Will Legislators’ Efforts to Amend the LDA Lead to Increasingly Hard-lined
Jurisprudence?, 18 B.Y.U . J. PUB. L. 131, 131–32 (2003) ( “[T]he lobbying that results in
. . . presidential pardons slips below the media’s radar primarily because of a
controversial loophole in the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. . . [T]he LDA does not
require that contributions to presidential libraries be disclosed.”).
7
Cf. Leah Rush & David Jimenez, States Outpace Congress in Upgrading
Lobbying Laws: 24 States Have Made Disclosure Strides Since 2003, CENTER FOR
PUBLIC
INTEGRITY,
Mar.
1,
2006,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/report.aspx?aid=781 (“A Center for Public
Integrity survey that evaluated the strength of lobbying disclosure laws nationwide found
the federal law to be weaker than those of 47 of the 50 states.”).
8
See David D. Kirkpatrick, Senate Passes Vast Overhaul in Ethics Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at A1 (discussing reforms).
9
David D. Kirkpatrick, Senate Feels Heat as House Cranks Up Ethics Overhaul,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007, at A13 [hereinafter Kirkpatrick, Senate Feels Heat]. See also
David D. Kirkpatrick, Congress Finds Ways to Avoid Lobbyist Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
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Citizens following media reports might easily conclude that the
situation is hopeless.10 However, this unfortunate state of affairs reflects
a lack of political will11—and the powerful influence of lobbyists12—
more than uncertainty as to what should be done. There are valuable
legal steps that can and should be taken to minimize the risks that
lobbying will corrupt the exercise of governmental power. As this article
demonstrates, for virtually every problem that one can identify relating to
lobbyists, some legislative body, somewhere in the country, has already
found a plausible solution.
It is important to remember that regulating lobbyists is a continuing
task that faces every generation. Even when reforms are passed, they are
often eroded by legal changes subsequently made to “loosen” the rules
when public attention is focused elsewhere. For example, the ban on gifts

11, 2007, at A1 (discussing arrangements to circumvent new lobbyist restrictions,
including one where a “$2,500 contribution from a lobbyist’s political action committee
entitles the company’s lobbyist to join . . . [a Congressman] at a Starbucks near his
Capitol Hill office four times”).
10
See David D. Kirkpatrick, Senate Bill Puts Campaign Gifts in the Spotlight, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2007, at A1 (reporting that the Senate passed a bill that would require
lobbyists to disclose “the tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars they raise from clients
and friends and deliver as sheaves of checks” to members of Congress, “a tradition
known as bundling,” but that House passage of the measure is “far from assured”). Cf.
Editorial, Ethics Reform Measures Littered with Loopholes, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESSNEWS, May 25, 2006, at 6B (“Give federal lawmakers a bill, a policy or an edict, and
they will find a loophole to circumvent it.”); Editorial, The Lobbyist Empowerment Act,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2006, at A22 (criticizing a proposed reform as an “Orwellian shell
of righteous platitudes about transparency and integrity”).
11
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Push to Tighten Lobbying Rules Loses Strength, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at A1 (reporting that “the drive for a tighter lobbying law . . . is
losing momentum”). Cf. Editorial, Razzle-Dazzle ‘Em Ethics Reform, N.Y. TIMES, June
21, 2006, at A16 (opining that congressional “lawmakers, globe-trotting at the giddy rate
of $10 million a year in free private excursions, . . . killed . . . [a proposed ban on
privately funded travel] and substituted cosmetic panaceas for their promised ethics
reform”).
12
See Editorial, Full Disclosure of Back-Scratching, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1 2007
(reporting that “K Street lobbyists” and others have stalled efforts to force disclosure of
“the huge sums in campaign donations that lobbyists package to grease privileged access
in the Capitol,” a practice known as “bundling”); Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Lobbyists Foresee
Business As Usual: Post-Abramoff Rules Expected to Be Merely a Nuisance, WASH.
POST, Mar. 19, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Birnbaum, Lobbyists] (“An estimated $10 billion
is spent annually to influence legislation and regulations.”); GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra
note 2, at 716 (“[T]he relative absence of limitations on lobbying is [due in part to] . . .
the lobbies’ consolidated and highly effective opposition to more regulation.”); James A.
Thurber, From Campaigning to Lobbying, in SHADES OF GRAY: PERSPECTIVES ON
CAMPAIGN ETHICS 152 (Candice J. Nelson et al. eds., 2002) (“15,000 full-time lobbyists
[are] registered by Congress representing virtually every type of interest in America. . . .
[And] there are thousands more individuals lobbying state legislatures, city councils and
executive branches at every level of American government.”).
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recently enacted by the U.S. House of Representatives13 is reminiscent of
reforms passed in the mid-1990s, which substantially tightened the rules
on gifts, but were relaxed after just four years in force.14 Regulation of
lobbyists is a never ending task, just as ethics in government is a goal
never permanently achieved.
Any effort to regulate lobbyists must begin by placing their conduct
in context. It is essential to understand both the surrogate role that
lobbyists play in communicating with public representatives, as well as
the constitutional principles that bear upon that endeavor. Only when
both that functional role and those constitutional principles are taken into
account is it possible to craft a legal regime to effectively minimize the
risk that lobbying will distort official decision-making.
The debate over the conduct of lobbyists is often so complex,
politicized, and confused as to leave those who might lead or support
reform efforts bewildered and hopeless. This Article addresses those
problems by describing clear points of reference for evaluating existing
rules and improving the standards of conduct governing lobbyists. Part II
of this Article examines the American practice of citizen participation in
government, including: the constitutionally protected right to petition the
government (subpart II.A); the role of lobbyists as citizen surrogates
(subpart II.B); the historical lineage of lobbying (subpart II.C); the perils
that can arise from improper lobbying practices (subpart II.D); and the
goals that should animate lobbyist restrictions (subpart II.E). Part III
discusses the prohibitions (subpart III.A) and disclosure requirements
(subpart III.B) that can be employed to regulate lobbying activities. Part
III also addresses the definitional and drafting problems inherent in any
attempt to expose to public scrutiny information about well-funded
lobbying that takes place “behind closed doors.” Finally, Part IV offers a
brief assessment of which types of lobbyist regulations are the most
effective in terms of furthering the interests of good government.
II. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT
A. RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION
In the American democracy, citizens play a vital role in government
by providing public officials and employees with requests for action,
information, and perspectives relating to the issues of the day.15 The right
13

See discussion infra subpart III.A.2.
See Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, Gifts and Travel, available at
http://www.house.gov/ethics/Gifts_and_Travel_Chapter.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007);
see also, infra note 156 and accompanying text.
15
See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
14
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to petition the government has long been recognized in Anglo-American
law.16 Enshrined in the United States Constitution17 and many state

137 (1961) (“In a representative democracy . . . [the executive and legislative] branches
of government act on behalf of the people and, to a very large extent, the whole concept
of representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known to
their representatives.”).
16
Indeed, the right to petition was recognized before American independence. See,
for example, McDonald v. Smith, where the Supreme Court stated:
The historical roots of the Petition Clause long antedate the Constitution. In
1689, the Bill of Rights exacted of William and Mary stated: “[I]t is the
Right of the Subjects to petition the King.” . . . This idea reappeared in the
Colonies when the Stamp Act Congress of 1765 included a right to petition
the King and Parliament in its Declaration of Rights and Grievances. . . . And
the Declarations of Rights enacted by many state conventions contained a
right to petition for redress of grievances.
472 U.S. 479, 482–83 (1985) (quoting 1 Wm. & Mary, Sess. 2, ch. 2) (citation omitted).
See also Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
667, 685–711 (2003) (tracing the right to petition as far back as the Magna Carta and
providing a detailed review of the right to petition in the colonies and early American
republic). Of course, citizen involvement in lawmaking is not unique to the AngloAmerican legal tradition. See generally Vincent Robert Johnson, The French Declaration
of the Rights of Man and Citizens of 1789, the Reign of Terror, and the Revolutionary
Tribunal of Paris, 13 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 35–36 & n.8 (1990) (discussing
Article VI of the French Declaration, which recognized that persons have the right to
participate in the formation of laws). The Declaration of the Rights of Man was greatly
influenced by provisions in early American state constitutions, which Benjamin Franklin
was instrumental in distributing in France while he was an ambassador in Paris from
1776 to 1784. Id. at 9–10 (citing J. MOORE, THE ROOTS OF FRENCH REPUBLICANISM 67–68
(1934). See also Sue Bentch, Confidentiality, Corporate Counsel, and Competition Law:
Representing Multi-National Corporations in the European Union, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J.
1003, 1010 (2004) (referring to “intense lobbying” in Europe).
17
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.”). See also Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (“First Amendment freedoms are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment from invasion by the States.”); Carol Rice Andrews, After BE & K: The
“Difficult Constitutional Question” of Defining the First Amendment Right to Petition
Courts, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1299, 1302 (2003) (“In the context of petitions to the
legislative or executive branches of government, the Supreme Court has held that the
right does not include a duty of response by those branches and does not include the right
to file sham or maliciously false petitions.”) (citing McDonald, 472 U.S. at 484, Minn.
State Bd. of Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 282, 285 (1984), and E. R.R.
Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 127)); Wishnie, supra note 16, at 668 & n.4 (“Oral as
well as written communications are protected as petitioning activity.”).15 See, e.g., ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 5 (“[P]eople have the right . . . to make known their opinions to their
representatives and to apply for redress of grievances.”); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 19
(“The people have a right . . . to request of the legislative body, by the way of addresses,
petitions, or remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances they
suffer.”); PA. CONST. art. I, § 20 (2006) (“The citizens have a right . . . to apply to those
invested with the powers of government for redress of grievances or other proper
purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.”).
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constitutions,18 the right to petition is an “important aspect of selfgovernment,”19 which is “recognized . . . as one of ‘the most precious of
the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.’”20 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has said on multiple occasions that the right to petition “is implied
by the very idea of a government, republican in form.”21
The right to petition is set against a backdrop of other important
constitutional guarantees, which, like the Petition Clause, are rooted in
the First Amendment. Freedom of association22 allows persons to join
together in groups to form and express their views.23 Likewise, freedom
of speech24 and freedom of the press25 broadly promote free expression
by shielding those who speak or write on subjects of public concern from
civil26 or criminal27 liability.
In considering the demands that the First Amendment imposes on
legal regulations, Justice Brennan famously observed that there is “a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open.”28 This commitment
to vigorous public debate is reflected in many arenas, ranging from the
19

McDonald, 472 U.S. at 483.
20 BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (quoting Mine

Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967)).
21
Id. at 524–25 (citing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876))
(internal punctuation omitted).
22
See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (“[I]mplicit in the right to
engage in activities protected by the First Amendment [is] a corresponding right to
associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
educational, religious, and cultural ends.”); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
250 (1957) (“Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have
the right to engage in political expression and association. . . . Exercise of these basic
freedoms in America has traditionally been through the media of political associations.”).
23
See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622 (“An individual’s freedom to speak, to worship,
and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously
protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group
effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.”); NAACP v. Button, 357 U.S. 449,
460 (1958) (“[It] is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of
speech.”).
24
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25
Id.
26
See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that, in
a defamation suit by a private person suing with respect to a matter of public concern, a
state may “not impose liability without fault” as to the falsity of the statement).
27
See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964) (reversing a criminal
defamation conviction because “even where the utterance is false, the great principles of
the Constitution which secure freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching
adverse consequences to any except the knowing or reckless falsehood”).
28
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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protection of academic freedom29 to the passage of anti-SLAPP30 statutes
in twenty-two states.31 Anti-SLAPP statutes make it easier for courts to
dismiss defamation suits and other32 retaliatory claims filed against
persons who speak out on public issues.33
America’s commitment to the open debate of public issues logically
extends beyond discussions among the citizenry to include
communications between citizens and public officials or employees. The
interests of democracy cannot be served by requiring those who petition
the government to do so with trepidation or excessive caution about what
they say or how frequently they express their views. The right to petition,
along with the related rights of association, speech, and press,34 must be
interpreted35 in a manner that invites vigorous,36 and sometimes
29

See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (“The
essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident.
No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who
guide and train our youth.”); see also Omosegbon v. Wells, 335 F.3d 668, 677 (7th Cir.
2003) (finding that the plaintiff’s academic freedom was not violated where he failed to
allege that he was “restricted from or sanctioned for speaking publicly about an issue”);
Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982) (“[T]o prevail over
academic freedom the interests of government must be strong and the extent of intrusion
carefully limited.”).
30
SLAPP is an acronym for a strategic lawsuit against public participation. “In
general terms, a SLAPP suit is ‘a meritless suit filed primarily to chill the defendant’s
exercise of First Amendment rights.’” Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman,
54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830, 834 (Cal. App. 1996) (citing Wilcox v. Superior Court 33 Cal. Rptr.
2d 446 (1994)).
31
Stephen L. Kling, Missouri’s New Anti-SLAPP Law, 61 J. MO. B. 124, 125
(2005) (“Twenty-two states have adopted anti-SLAPP legislation to further protect
citizens in exercising their rights of free speech and to petition government as guaranteed
by the First Amendment.”). See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2006); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-7-7-9 (West 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.635–.670 (2005).
32
See Street Beat Sportswear, Inc. v. Nat’l Mobilization Against Sweatshops, 698
N.Y.S.2d 820 (App. Div. 1999) (holding that an action for tortious interference with
business relationships amounted to a SLAPP, in violation of statute).
33
The core provisions of these laws are: (i) establishment of a process for
motions to dismiss or strike claims targeting public participation; (ii)
expediting the hearing of such motions and suspending or sharply limiting
discovery until a ruling is made; and (iii) shifting the attorneys’ fees and
costs to the filer when the target prevails on the motion.
Kling, supra note 31, at 125 (citing Lori Potter, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation and Petition Clause Immunity, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10852, 10856 (July
2001)).
34
Wishnie, supra note 16, at 719 (“The modern Supreme Court has generally
regarded the right to petition as subsumed within the more familiar rights of speech and
association, and the Court’s extensive speech jurisprudence thus supplies a useful
reference for examining the Petition Clause . . .”).
35
Id. at 715 (“Few litigants have pressed claims under the Petition Clause, and few
courts have engaged in significant analysis of the scope or content of the rights it
protects.”).
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controversial,37 discussion of public affairs.38
B. PETITIONING THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH SURROGATES
In some instances, it is necessary or appropriate for persons seeking
to petition the government to channel their efforts through volunteer or
paid intermediaries. Such representatives, at least when they are paid, are
often called lobbyists.39 Though widely vilified,40 lobbyists representing
36
Cf. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
138 (1961) (holding that a publicity campaign by railroads directed toward obtaining
governmental action adverse to the interests of trucking companies was not illegal even
though it may have been affected by an anticompetitive purpose). In E. R.R. Presidents
Conference, Justice Black wrote:
To hold . . . that the people cannot freely inform the government of their
wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business
activity, but political activity, a purpose which would have no basis whatever
in the legislative history of that Act. . . [S]uch a construction . . . would raise
important constitutional questions. The right of petition is one of the
freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly
impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms.
Id. at 137–38.
37
See Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 57 (1967) (“[T]he First Amendment, which
protects a controversial as well as a conventional dialogue . . . extends to petitions for
redress of grievances . . . as well as to advocacy and debate.”).
38
Cf. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 49–50 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“The right to petition for the redress of grievances has an ancient history and is not
limited to writing a letter or sending a telegram to a congressman; it is not confined to
appearing before the local city council, or writing letters to the President or Governor or
Mayor.”). However, the mere fact that legal regulations may place some burden on the
exercise of the right to petition does not mean that the regulations are unconstitutional.
See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 828 n.6 (1974) (“[T]he alternative means of
communication with the press that are available to prisoners, together with the substantial
access to prisons that California accords the press and other members of the public
satisfies whatever right the inmates may have to petition the government through the
press.”). In Pell, the inmates had argued that a regulation which precluded face-to-face
interviews with the media was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to petition the government. Id. at 817.
39
William Safire traces the political use of the term “lobbyist” to the midseventeenth century, when citizens would use a large anteroom, or lobby, near the
English House of Commons to plead their cause to members of Parliament”). GUIDE TO
CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 691 (citing WILLIAM SAFIRE, WILLIAM SAFIRE’S POLITICAL
DICTIONARY 383 (1980)). In America, “[t]he first recorded use of the word, according to
H.L. Mencken, was in 1829, the year in which Andrew Jackson became President. It
originally appeared as ‘lobby-agent’ and was applied to seekers after special privilege at
the Capitol in Albany. . . From the beginning it was a term of reproach . . .”
SCHRIFTGIESSER, supra note 2, at 5.
40
“For most Americans the words ‘Washington lobbyist’ have roughly the same
cachet as, say, ‘deadbeat dad.”’ Meredith A. Capps, Note, “Gouging the Government”:
Why a Federal Contingency Fee Lobbying Prohibition Is Consistent with First
Amendment Freedoms, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1885, 1886 (2005) (quoting David Segal, Main
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individuals or groups can make a valuable contribution to informed and
effective government. Lobbyists can direct ideas and opinions to
appropriate decision makers and clearly express the views of citizens
who have too little time or skill to do so personally.41 Lobbyists also
illuminate the practical consequences of proposed government conduct42
by ensuring that the insights and professional expertise of a particular
business or industry become part of the deliberative process.43
Lobbying, as an exercise of the right to petition, is not necessarily
44
evil. In addition to the interests of the business community, lobbyists
routinely advance the interests of nonprofit institutions45 and public
interest groups.46 Some of the most vulnerable segments of society,
including young children,47 the elderly,48 and laborers,49 have benefited
Street America Has Advocates Aplenty: On the Hill, Lobbyists for All, WASH. POST, July
10, 1995, at A1). See generally JEFFREY M. BERRY WITH DAVID F. ARONS, A VOICE FOR
NONPROFITS 48–49 (2003) (discussing lobbying as a “dirty word”); GUIDE TO CONGRESS,
supra note 2, at 691 (discussing the “pejorative connotation” of lobbying).
41
See generally John Chwat, The Use of Outside Legislative Consultants: When
and How to Hire a Lobbyist, in THE LEGISLATIVE LABYRINTH: A MAP FOR NOT-FORPROFITS 111 (Walter P. Pidgeon, Jr., ed., 2001) (discussing the skills of effective
lobbyists).
42
See GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 691 (“[I]t is in large part through
lobbying that government gets its information.”).
43
See Gary Scharrer, Lobbying Didn’t Let Up When the CHIP was Down, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 14, 2006, at 1A (quoting the executive director of the
Center for Public Policy Priorities, a group that tracks issues affecting low- and middleincome Texans, as stating that “[l]obbyists bring expertise about how the real world
works. . . . You couldn’t do without the lobby”); see also BRUCE C. WOLPE & BERTRAM J.
LEVINE, LOBBYING CONGRESS: HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS 50 (2d ed. 1996) (opining that
lobbyists “who can volunteer substantive assistance—legislative proposals, speeches,
floor statements, drafts of op-ed articles—are cultivated” by legislators); Birnbaum,
Lobbyists, supra note 12 (quoting a Washington lawyer as stating that at the federal level
“legislation and regulations are so complex that the need for professional lobbyists will
not diminish”).
44
See generally GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 700–15 (discussing lobbying
by business groups, labor, environmentalists, farmers, public-interest groups, civil-rights
groups, education groups, churches, and others).
45
See Chwat, supra note 41, at 111 (“[H]iring an outside legislative consultant or
lobbyist is a widely accepted practice by trade and professional associations,
corporations, unions, and not-for-profit organizations.”). See generally BERRY, supra
note 40, at 25–31 (discussing nonprofit organizations as lobbies).
46
See WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 43, at 3 (discussing public-interest groups); see
also Women’s Caucus Converges on Washington to Lobby Congress, TRIAL, June 2005,
at 10 (describing lobbying efforts by women trial lawyers “to tell lawmakers how
proposed medical malpractice legislation would hurt women, children, senior citizens,
and all consumers”).
47
Mary Gereau, one of the first women lobbyists in Washington, D.C., actively
promoted the Higher Education Act of 1965 and the Head Start Act. See Yvonne
Shinhoster Lamb, Mary Gereau, 89; Lobbyist on Education, ERA, WASH. POST, Mar. 2,
2006, at B6.
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from lobbying. Indeed, even cities and other local government entities
hire lobbyists to advocate their interests in state legislatures50 or before
the federal government.51
From a business standpoint, hiring a lobbyist is often the smart thing
to do. According to some experts, “[s]uccess in the legislative labyrinth
is . . . directly proportional to hiring the right” lobbyists or legislative
consultants.52 Viewed systemically, “[t]he relationship between special
interests, acting through lobbyists, and legislators is central to
understanding much of the legislative process.”53
C. HISTORICAL LINEAGE
The roots of lobbying in the United States reach back to the early
days of the republic. According to one source, when the Adamses from
the Bay Colony trekked to the “first Continental Congress as
representatives of the restless New Englanders . . . they were met by a
group of lobbyists, sent to . . . steer the[m] . . . away from any dangerous
ideas of independence they might be prepared to press.”54
All through the sessions of the Congress lobbying went
on in full force. . . . The hogsheads of Madeira and port
that were dispensed and the huge dinners of mutton and
pork, duck and turkey . . . were not offered without a
purpose. The merchants, the landowners, the Quakers,
the followers of the powerful John Dickinson, used all
the wiles of wealth and social prestige to prevent the

48

See GUIDE

TO

CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 694 (discussing lobbying by the

AARP).
49
“Much of the Great Society legislation of the 1960s, under President Lyndon B.
Johnson, was the product of lobbying by organized labor.” GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra
note 2, at 702. See also WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 43, at 3–4 (discussing labor unions);
Sanford Nowlin, Swarming Capitol Paid Off for SBC, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
Apr. 13, 2006, at 1A (discussing lobbying by the Communications Workers of America
union).
50
See Greg Jefferson, San Antonio Gears Up to Draw on Its “Hired Guns” at
Legislature, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 13, 2006, at 8A (discussing six lobbyists
hired for a total cost of $575,700); see also Nowlin, supra note 49, at 1A (stating that the
Texas Municipal League lobbies on behalf of cities).
51
See Jodi Rudoren & Aron Pilhofer, Hiring Lobbyists for Federal Aid, Towns
Learn That Money Talks, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2006, at 1 (“Cities and towns—and school
districts and transit authorities and utility agencies—across the country are increasingly . .
. putting lobbyists on retainer to leverage local tax dollars into federal tax dollars.”).
52
Chwat, supra note 41, at 112.
53
Fred S. McChesney, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND
POLITICAL EXTORTION 46 (1997).
54
SCHRIFTGIESSER, supra note 2, at 4.
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delegates from the other colonies from insisting upon
any drastic action that might endanger the colonial way
of life.55
The taverns that served the stage coaches running to the nation’s
capital also became places where “men and even women ‘lobbied’ for
different causes or needs”56 in a “very informal, unorganized and
spontaneous” manner.57 “Alexander Hamilton’s Philadelphia Society for
the Promotion of National Industry, [was the first formal] business lobby
formed for the purpose of influencing legislatures on behalf of a
powerful faction.”58 The later success of the Boston Manufacturing
Company’s lobbying effort, which persuaded Congress to enact the first
protective tariff in 1816, emboldened other manufacturers to send
lobbying agents to the capital.59
In earlier eras, government ethics rules were even weaker than they
are today. In the 1830’s, outside interests could and did hire sitting
members of Congress to represent them. “Thus, when President Andrew
Jackson was battling with the Bank of the United States, Sen. Daniel
Webster of Massachusetts was one of the bank’s biggest defenders.”60
Decades later, “[a] lobby headed by Thomas A. Scott, President of the
Pennsylvania Railroad, and Iowa congressman Grenville M. Dodge . . .
convinced southern congressmen that the only way the Texas & Pacific
Railway would be built from East Texas to the Pacific coast depended
upon a Republican victory”61 in the disputed presidential election of
1876.62
D. THE DARK SIDE OF LOBBYING
Despite lobbying’s ancient lineage and constitutional pedigree, past
55

Id.
Robert V. Remini, THE HOUSE: THE HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 38 (2006).
57
Id.
58
Id. at 6. But see 2 ROBERT C. BYRD, Lobbyists, in THE SENATE, 1789–1989:
ADDRESSES ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 491, 492 (1988) (“William
Hull was hired by the Virginia veterans of the Continental army to lobby for additional
compensation for their war services. In 1792, Hull wrote to other veterans’ groups,
recommending that they have their ‘agent or agents’ cooperate with him during the next
session to pass a compensation bill. In 1795, a Philadelphia newspaper described the way
lobbyists waited outside Congress Hall to ‘give a hint to a Member, teaze [sic] or advise
as may best suit.’”).
59
See REMINI, supra note 56, at 102 (discussing the tariff and lobbying).
60
Cf. GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 692.
61
REMINI, supra note 56, at 216.
62
See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL CRISIS: THE DISPUTED
ELECTION OF 1876 (2004).
56
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experience shows that some types of lobbying can have detrimental
effects on the performance of official duties and thereby erode public
confidence in government. During the Civil War, for example,
“[l]obbyists were increasingly employed to serve the interests of . . .
entrepreneurs and found many congressmen of both parties only too
happy to cooperate in ‘sweetheart arrangements’ for a financial
consideration. . . Bribes and secret deals were not uncommon, and
conflict of interest was rampant.”63 Although modern practices are more
subtle, lobbying continues to pose threats to the proper operation of
government. This is particularly true in cases where lobbyists distort
relevant facts, produce decisions based on favoritism rather than the
merits,64 or give some segments of the community a real or perceived
unfair advantage in securing access to members of government.
Lobbying activities that occur outside the scrutiny of neutral third
parties are of particular concern,65 for, as a general matter, bad practices
thrive in contexts where there are reduced risks of detection and
exposure.66 For example, when dubious Congressional “earmarking”67
practices are coupled with lobbying, “dollars are doled out, often in
secret, at the whim of a lone legislator—often under the influence of a
lobbyist—rather than through a competitive process.”68 There is also
63

REMINI, supra note 56, at 183.
Cf. Id. at 241 (arguing that the railroads’ powerful lawyers and lobbyists all but
rendered the Interstate Commerce Commission “virtually powerless” in the late 1800s).
65
See Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441, 451 (1874) (invalidating a contingent-fee
agreement to lobby Congress, the Supreme Court observed that “[n]ot unfrequently [sic]
the facts are whispered to those whose duty it is to investigate, vouched for by them, and
the passage of the measure is thus secured. If the agent is truthful, and conceals nothing,
all is well. If he uses nefarious means with success, the spring-head and the stream of
legislation are polluted”). Cf. Thurber, supra note 12, at 152 (opining that “the lack of
transparency in the relationship between elected officials and campaign consultantlobbyists” poses “a problem for democracy”).
66
Similar issues are raised by in-person solicitation of clients by lawyers under
circumstances screened from the watchful eye of third parties. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978) (addressing the effect of in-person solicitation, the Court
observed, “there is no opportunity for intervention or counter-education by agencies of
the Bar, supervisory authorities, or persons close to the solicited individual”). See also
Vincent R. Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm Clients by Departing Partners and
Associates: Tort, Fiduciary, and Disciplinary Liability, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 28–29 &
n.92 (1988) (discussing solicitation issues).
67
Earmarking is “a budgetary process used by members of Congress to send
federal dollars to favored projects.” Adam Nagourney, House at Stake, Midterm Election
Gets Early Start, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2006, at A1, 2006. Sometimes it involves
“lucrative favors that lawmakers secretly cram into spending bills at the behest of deeppocketed contractors.” Editorial, The Million-Dollar House on the Hill, N.Y. TIMES, June
10, 2006, at A12.
68
An examination of one lobbying firm showed that “$9.8 million in lobbying fees
translated into $173 million in earmarks, or a return of $18.41 on every dollar spent.”
64
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widespread apprehension about lobbying by former public servants who,
after entering the private sector, exploit connections to those still in
power.69 The same is true of lobbying that involves the expenditure of
large amounts of money.70 Each of these practices create the risk that
other members of the community will not fairly be heard by the persons
elected, appointed, or employed to act on behalf of the government. Left
unchecked, pernicious lobbying practices threaten public confidence in
government and, as a result, the legitimacy of government itself.71
Regulation of such lobbying practices is necessary in order to
adequately address these risks. However, ethical or legal restrictions on
lobbyists must neither intrude upon constitutional rights, nor impede
unnecessarily the “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”72 debate of public
issues.
E. THE GOALS OF LOBBYIST REGULATIONS
Lobbying regulations are not meant to discourage persons from
exercising their right to petition the government, nor to harass those who
take advantage of that right. Rather, carefully crafted lobbyist rules
should address five concerns of great importance to democratic
institutions. The rules governing lobbyists should ensure (1) that all
persons have a fair opportunity to be heard by the government, (2) that
Rudoren & Pilhofer, supra note 51, at 16. See also Editorial, Lobbyists, Yes. The People,
Maybe., N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2006 (“The news that the Washington lobbying industry is
rapidly extending its tentacles into cities, towns and school districts across the country
should be an outright embarrassment to Congress [because] [e]lected lawmakers—not
high-paid lobbyists—are supposed to be best attuned to meeting the needs of their
localities.”).
69
See Vincent R. Johnson, Ethics in Government at the Local Level, 36 SETON
HALL. L. REV. 715, 744 (2006) [hereinafter Johnson, Ethics in Government] (“Citizens
are often deeply cynical when former city officials and employees represent private
interests in dealings with the city government. The citizens suspect, sometimes rightly,
that the former city officials and employees are trading on their connections with those
still in government service, and that the private interests they represent will have an
unfair advantage in achieving the results they seek.”) (citations omitted).
70
See Lisa Sandberg & Kelly Guckian, Lobbyists’ Money Talks—Softly, But It’s
Heard, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 12, 2006, at 1A (stating that Texas’ “bestpaid lobbyist says it would be naive to suggest that big bucks aren’t effective . . . ‘There
isn’t a level playing field.’”). Cf. Editorial, Still a Bad Deal, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2006
[hereinafter Still a Bad Deal] (stating that “with so much pro-India lobbying money
sloshing around” on Capitol Hill, there is little hope that Congress will effectively
address a bad nuclear cooperation deal with India).
71
Cf. Archibald Cox, Ethics in Government: The Cornerstone of Public Trust, 94
W. VA. L. REV. 281, 288 (1991–92) (“The public will not give the necessary trust to those
who present government as the place where one feathers his own nest, exchanges favors
with friends and former associates, and takes good care of those who will reward them.”).
72
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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government enjoys the confidence of the people, (3) that official
decisions are based on accurate information, (4) that the citizenry knows
how the government operates, and (5) that the performance of public
business benefits from the wisdom of the community.
The first objective is sometimes referred to as the “level-playingfield” concern.73 America has long been deeply committed to this
principle.74 The right to a level playing field is sometimes called equal
protection of the laws, as set down by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.75 The Equal Protection Clause is the basis of the
important rules that prevent invidious discrimination in education, hiring,
and public accommodations or that hold that jobs in the public sector
should be awarded on the basis of qualifications rather than as a form of
patronage.76 The root idea is that in pursuing desirable things in life, each
person should have a chance to compete on equal terms—or as Abraham
Lincoln said, a “fair chance in the race of life.”77 In the lobbying context,
practices that improperly give some persons advantages over others
(such as gifts to public officials) run afoul of the “level-playing-field”
principle.
The second objective in regulating lobbyists is to preserve public
confidence in political institutions by ensuring that they are fair not only
in operation, but also in appearance.78 In other words, it is necessary to
avoid the “appearance of corruption.”79 Perceived corruption, like

73
See Vincent R. Johnson, America’s Preoccupation with Ethics in Government,
30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 717, 725–33 (1999) [hereinafter Johnson, America’s Preoccupation]
(discussing rules applicable to judges, lawyers, and public servants that seek to ensure a
level playing field in public life).
74
See id. at 735–45 (arguing that the search for social equality was a dominant
theme in twentieth century America).
75
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
76
See Gretchen Reuthling, Chicago Officials Convicted in Patronage
Arrangement, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2006, at A14 (describing a successful criminal
prosecution based on actions that “violated a 30-year-old federal court order, the
Shakman decree, that prohibits political considerations in hiring and promotions for about
37,000 city jobs”).
77
Lincoln described the Northern cause in the Civil War as saving a form of
government “whose leading object is to elevate the condition of men – to lift artificial
weights from all shoulders—to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for all—to afford all,
an unfettered start, and a fair chance in the race of life.” 4 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Message
to Congress, in IV COLLECTED WORKS OF LINCOLN 438 (Roy Basler ed. 1953).
78
Cf. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.A. § 1601(3) (West 2005) (“[T]he
effective public disclosure of the identity and extent of the efforts of paid lobbyists to
influence Federal officials in the conduct of Government actions will increase public
confidence in the integrity of Government.”).
79
Cf. McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 142 (2003)
(recognizing “the Government’s important interest in preventing corruption and the
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corruption itself, can destroy a democratic institution.80 Thus, lobbyist
rules should restrict practices that create an appearance of impropriety,
such as business transactions between legislators and lobbyists,81 the
presence of lobbyists on the floor of the House or Senate,82 or service by
a lobbyist as the treasurer for a legislator’s re-election campaign.83
The third goal of lobbyist rules is to guarantee that public decisions
are based upon accurate information. In this, as in other contexts, the law
“presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of
a multitude of tongues,”84 than from a single voice. To avoid
misunderstandings, the First Amendment favors the dissemination of
more information, not less.85 Consequently, government ethics rules
should not only ban culpable falsehoods by lobbyists, but also seek to
move the debate of public issues into public view,86 where arguments can
be considered, contested, and judged on their merits. In addition, through

appearance of corruption” in the context of campaign contribution restrictions).
80
Cf. TOM WICKER, THE NIXON YEARS, 1969-1974: WHITE HOUSE TO WATERGATE
184–85 (1999) (discussing President Nixon’s declaration, “I am not a crook,” and
subsequent resignation). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote about Martin T. Manton, a
distinguished Second Circuit judge who accepted bribes during the 1930s depression and
then defended himself against criminal charges by claiming that he had only sought
bribes from parties “in whose favor he had already decided to rule on the basis of the
law.” WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF
JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 123 (1992). Because the
appellate court sat in panels and other judges testified that Manton’s “conduct in
conference had in no way reflected bias,” it may have been true that none of the bribes
had played a pivotal role in the resolution of cases. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 569
(1984). Nevertheless, it was necessary for Manton to step down because his conduct
created a grave appearance of impropriety that impaired public confidence in the
administration of justice. Id. The same analysis would apply to a judge who takes bribes
from both parties and then claims to be uninfluenced. See id. (discussing the fall of Lord
Chancellor Francis Bacon in the 1600s).
81
See discussion infra subpart III.A.6.
82
See, e.g., IND. CODE. ANN. § 2-7-5-4 (LexisNexis 2002) (“No past member of the
general assembly who is a lobbyist may be on the floor of either house while that house is
in session.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.811(10) (West 2004) (“A . . . lobbyist shall not go
upon the floor of either house . . . except upon invitation of that house.”); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 6B-3-8 (LexisNexis 2003) (including the foyer of either house).
83
See infra notes 177–87, 284–301 and accompanying text.
84
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (quoting Judge
Learned Hand in United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943)).
85
Cf. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977) (stating that with
respect to potentially misleading lawyer advertising, “the preferred remedy is more
disclosure, rather than less”).
86
Cf. John M. Black, Silicosis Still a Problem, TEX. LAW., Nov. 25, 2002, at 35
(discussing a “lobbying effort [that] led to countless unnecessary exposures to a known
hazard in Texas petrochemical plants”), available at 11/25/2002 TEXLAW 35
(Westlaw).
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disclosure requirements, ethics rules should assist public representatives
in scrutinizing the petitioners who come before them. As Chief Justice
Earl Warren remarked:
[L]egislative complexities are such that individual
members of Congress cannot be expected to explore the
myriad pressures to which they are regularly subjected.
Yet full realization of the American ideal of government
by elected representatives depends to no small extent on
their ability to properly evaluate such pressures.
Otherwise the voice of the people may all too easily be
drowned out by the voice of special interest groups
seeking favored treatment while masquerading as
proponents of the public weal.87
The fourth goal in regulating lobbyists is to ensure that people have
access to accurate information about how the government operates.88
This knowledge is an essential component of representative
government.89 Otherwise, the citizenry cannot accurately evaluate the
performance of their representatives or cast ballots at the voting booth
reflecting that assessment.90 In the words of Judge J. Skelly Wright, “the
public has an interest in knowing who is influencing or attempting to
influence their public officers, for what purpose, the means adopted to
that purpose, and the results achieved.”91 These concerns animate the
lobbyist registration and reporting requirements that have been adopted
at the federal, state, and local levels.92
Finally, as a fifth objective, lobbyist rules should not impede
87

United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (holding that the disclosure
requirements of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, which “wants only to know
who is being hired, who is putting up the money, and how much,” did not violate the First
Amendment freedoms “to speak, publish, and petition the Government”).
88
ACLU of N.J. v. N.J. Election Law Enf. Comm’n, 509 F. Supp. 1123, 1129 (D.
N.J. 1981) (recognizing that regulation of lobbying serves the state’s “strong interest in
promoting openness in the system by which its laws are created”). “Disenchantment . . .
with the political process today stems from a lack of knowledge of its details. . . ” Id.
(quoting THE ELECTION LAW REV’N COMM’N, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND
LEGISLATURE PURSUANT TO P.L. 1964, C. 29; P.L. 1965, C. 73; P.L. 1969, C. 192; P.L.
1970, C. 42 at 2 (1970).
89
Cf. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.A. § 1601(1) (West 2005)
(“[R]esponsible representative Government requires public awareness of the efforts of
paid lobbyists to influence the public decisionmaking process.”).
90
See ACLU of N.J., 509 F. Supp. at 1129 (recognizing that “regulation of
lobbying serves the needs of the electorate” by enabling the “voting public . . . to evaluate
the performance of their elected officials”).
91
Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (J. Skelly
Wright, concurring).
92
See discussion infra subpart III.B.
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lobbyists and their clients from contributing to the effective resolution of
public issues. Because the American public is often reluctant to provide
funding for the staffing and expertise needed by legislative bodies,
administrative agencies, and other organs of government,93 official
decision makers frequently operate with minimal support. Indeed,
“[c]ongressional staffs rarely have the resources to gather their own data
and examples.”94 Such obstacles are also present at the state and local
levels. Lobbyists who provide clear arguments and accurate information
to public servants can play an important role in closing the gap between
needs and resources.95 Consequently, the rules governing lobbyists
should not impede those practices that assist the government in doing its
work.
Regulating lobbyists involves essentially the same challenges at the
federal, state, and local levels of government. In each venue, the
objective is to ensure that lobbying does not deprive other persons of the
chance to be heard, diminish confidence in government, distort through
falsehood the exercise of governmental power, or deprive voters and
officials of relevant information. The smaller size of local governments
may dictate a more streamlined regulatory regime than might be
appropriate at the state capitol or in Washington, D.C. However,
throughout the American democracy, the obstacles created by pernicious
lobbying practices are basically the same.
III. THE LEGAL TOOLS FOR REGULATING LOBBYISTS
The legal tools for regulating lobbyists come in two basic varieties:
prohibitions and disclosure requirements. Legal prohibitions identify
practices that are impermissible, either on all occasions or beyond
specified limits. Such rules may be used to prohibit false statements,96
93
Cf. Vincent R. Johnson, Liberating Progress and the Free Market from the
Specter of Tort Liability, 83 NW. U.L. REV. 1026, 1048–51 (1989) [hereinafter Johnson,
Liberating Progress] (discussing the budgetary limitations of administrative agencies and
arguing that “[h]istory demonstrates that they are frequently underfunded and lack the
personnel and other resources that are needed”); Editorial, Voters Should Pass Prop. 81,
Measure A, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Walnut Creek, Cal.), May 14, 2006, at F4 (criticizing
inadequate funding for libraries); Editorial, For Oregon Schools, Let the Round-Up
Begin, OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), Feb. 15, 2006, at C8 (noting that “[d]uring the past
five years, a majority of states have been sued about inadequate school funding”);
Editorial, Local Help for Indigent Mentally Ill is Hard to Find, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2006, at 12A (discussing inadequate funding for care of the mentally ill).
94
GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 697.
95
See supra note 89 and accompanying text. Cf. David Epstein & Sharyn
O’Halloran, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 227, 227 (1995) (contending that “lobbyists can
facilitate Congress’s oversight role . . . [by] reduc[ing] informational asymmetries
between Congress and the bureaucracy”).
96
See discussion infra subpart III.A.1.
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limit gifts to public officials or employees,97 restrict the scope or
frequency of revolving-door employment,98 or bar lobbyists from
collecting contingent fees99 or exacting economic reprisals against
legislators.100
Disclosure requirements, in contrast, do not ban particular practices.
Rather, they expose information to community scrutiny by making data
available to the public.101 For example, disclosure regimes typically seek
to reveal whom a lobbyist represents and how much money the
lobbyist’s client is spending to influence a decision on a particular issue.
While conceptually appealing, disclosure requirements are hard to
implement because it is difficult to determine what information should be
reported, who should be required to report, and how that information can
be made available to the public in a timely fashion. As a result, some
disclosure schemes are exceedingly complex and, as a result, lack the
ethical clarity and efficacy that simpler rules might provide.102
A. PROHIBITIONS
1. False Statements
False statements of fact can distort the decision-making process.
This is as true in politics as it is in business. In the commercial context,
numerous rules protect consumers and entities from the harm that
erroneous information can cause. Tort actions for fraud103 and negligent
97

See discussion infra subpart III.A.2.
See discussion infra subpart III.A.4.
99
See discussion infra subpart III.A.5.
100
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6621(b)(5) (2006) (providing that a lobbyist
shall not “[e]xercise any economic reprisal, extortion, or unlawful retaliation upon any
legislator by reason of such legislator’s position with respect to, or his vote upon, any
pending or proposed legislation”).
101
Cf. THE BETTER GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION, THE BGA INTEGRITY INDEX 17
(2002),
http://www.bettergov.org/pdfs/IntegrityIndex_10.22.02.pdf
(“[R]equiring
disclosure [of campaign contributions] where they are allowed will prevent certain abuses
of authority, particularly with regards to undue influence by lobbyists.”).
102
Cf. Mark Davies, Governmental Ethics Laws: Myths and Mythos, 40 N.Y. L.
SCH. L. REV. 177, 178 (1995) (opining that “whenever possible, ethics codes should
contain bright-line rules and never three-armed lawyer gobbledygook—that is, on the one
hand this, on . . . the other hand that, and on the third hand something else”); Vincent R.
Johnson, The Virtues and Limits of Codes in Legal Ethics, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 25, 41 (2000) [hereinafter Johnson, Virtues and Limits of Codes]
(recommending that “[a]t a minimum, an ethics rule should be understandable,
memorable, predictable, and capable of efficient enforcement,” and stating that rules
which are “[i]ntricately drafted, finely nuanced, and exhaustive . . . [may] generate
uncertainty in the minds of those seeking to follow or apply them”).
103
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) (discussing liability for
98
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misrepresentation,104 along with statutory claims for deceptive trade
practices,105 exist in virtually all jurisdictions. However, there is an
important distinction between political speech and commercial speech.
The latter is afforded less protection by the Constitution106 and is
therefore more susceptible to legal regulation.107 However, with respect
to political speech, the Supreme Court has recognized that the “erroneous
statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the
freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need .
. . to survive.’”108 Thus, civil or criminal liability is not typically imposed
(on lobbyists or others) for false statements related to matters of public
concern absent proof of “actual malice.” Actual malice requires evidence
that the defendant acted with knowledge of the falsity or in reckless
disregard for the truth. 109
fraudulent misrepresentation); see also Vincent R. Johnson & Shawn M. Lovorn,
Misrepresentation by Lawyers about Credentials or Experience, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 529,
557 (2005)(“A cause of action for fraud protects the plaintiff’s decision-making process
from being infected by false, misleading, or incomplete information.”).
104
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) (discussing liability for
negligent misrepresentation).
105
“[E]very state in the union has passed some form of legislation aimed at
protecting consumers from sales abuses.” DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE
LAW § 3:1 (2005).
106
See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (“[The Constitution] accords a lesser protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”).
107
See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (stating that
commercial speech enjoys “‘a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,’ and is subject to ‘modes of
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression’”
(quoting Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989)).
108
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–79 (1964). Addressing
the rule of defamation law which held that truth was a defense, Justice Brennan wrote:
Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the
defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred. . . . Under
such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing
their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in
fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the
expense of having to do so. . . . The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits
the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Id. at 279.
109
See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985) (holding that the Petition
Clause did not provide absolute immunity to defendants charged with expressing libelous
and damaging falsehoods in petitions to government officials, but that state law only
allowed for damages for defamation if the defendant acted with “knowledge . . . that the
words are false, or . . . without probable cause or without checking for truth by the means
at hand”); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80 (“[C]onstitutional
guarantees require . . . a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that
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Liability for deception further requires a provably false assertion of
fact.110 A pure statement of opinion that does not imply false facts does
not give rise to liability.111 Presumably, these constitutional principles
apply just as readily to lobbyist regulations as in other areas of the law.112
For example, a lobbyist’s deliberate misrepresentation of product test
results might give rise to legal sanctions, since test results are a matter of
fact. However, a lobbyist’s views about whether a proposed law would
be beneficial to consumers would be beyond legal reproach, if such
statements were purely opinion.
Prohibitions against false statements of fact by lobbyists are an
important tool for preventing abuse. The Code of Ethics of the American
League of Lobbyists supports the view that honesty and integrity113 are
essential aspects of effective lobbying.114 Thus, provisions at the state115
and local116 levels which bar false statements by lobbyists stand on solid
the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”).
110
See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that an obscene
parody could not support an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress unless
the publication contained a false statement of fact).
111
See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (finding that a statement
in a newspaper column alleging that the petitioner lied at a hearing was “sufficiently
factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false” in a defamation action).
112
Cf. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.A. § 1607(a)(3) (West 2005)
(providing that the act shall not “be construed to prohibit or interfere with . . . the right to
express a personal opinion”).
113
AMERICAN LEAGUE OF LOBBYISTS’ CODE OF ETHICS §§ 1.1–9.2,
http://www.alldc.org/ethicscode.htm. Article I of the code provides:
A lobbyist should conduct lobbying activities with honesty and integrity.
1.1. A lobbyist should be truthful in communicating with public officials and
with other interested persons and should seek to provide factually correct,
current and accurate information.
1.2. If a lobbyist determines that the lobbyist has provided a public official or
other interested person with factually inaccurate information of a significant,
relevant, and material nature, the lobbyist should promptly provide the
factually accurate information to the interested person.
1.3. If a material change in factual information that the lobbyist provided
previously to a public official causes the information to become inaccurate
and the lobbyist knows the public official may still be relying upon the
information, the lobbyist should provide accurate and updated information to
the public official.
Id. at art. I.
114
See WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 43, at 13 (discussing why not telling the truth
“will come home to haunt the lobbyist and harm his or her prospects on this and other
issues”).
115
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(a)(3) (2004) (barring intentional
deception). See generally Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 667 (“[M]any states prohibit
lobbyists from ‘deceiving’ officials with regard to material facts or information pertinent
to pending action.”).
116
See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-
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ground in terms of ethical and business principles. However, if such legal
rules do not expressly include a culpability requirement,117 presumably
they must be applied in a manner that is consistent with the First
Amendment and the actual malice standard. This is important, for it is
often difficult to establish actual malice.118 Even so, prohibitions against
false statements by lobbyists are an important tool for preventing abuse.
First, a ban on misrepresentations by lobbyists is an essential symbol,
without which the moral force of a law purporting to regulate lobbyists is
seriously undercut. Second, such restrictions are readily understood by
the public, urged by reformers, and invoked by government
“watchdogs.” Third, the nature of modern communication sometimes
makes it possible to prove actual malice. Lobbyists often rely on
extensive written material to make the case for their clients.119 Electronic
messages, including email,120 and surreptitious recordings can often be
used to prove what was said and to scrutinize those statements.121

67(a) (2006) (“A person who lobbies or engages another person to lobby, or any other
person acting on behalf of such persons, shall not intentionally or knowingly make any
false or misleading statement of fact to any city official, or, knowing a document to
contain a false statement, cause a copy of such document to be received by a city official
without notifying such official in writing of the truth.”); see also id. at § 2-67(b) (“A
registrant who learns that a statement contained in a registration form or activity report
filed by the registrant during the past three (3) years is false shall not fail to correct that
statement by written notification to the City Clerk within thirty days of learning of the
falsehood.”).
117
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 86205(b) (West 2005) (stating that no
lobbyist or lobbying firm shall “[d]eceive or attempt to deceive any elected state officer,
legislative official, agency official, or state candidate with regard to any material fact
pertinent to any pending or proposed legislative or administrative action”).
118
See generally Vincent R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT
LAW 991–95 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing proof of actual malice in defamation litigation).
119
See GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 696 (quoting a legislative aide as
stating that “there’s a new breed of lobbyist around. There’s less of the slap-on-the-back .
. . approach. Now it’s ‘Here’s a twenty-page paper full of technical slides, charts, . . . , a
table . . . , and some language in case you’d like to introduce an amendment.’”). But see
Barry M. Aarons, So You Want to be a Lobbyist?, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Dec. 1998, at 26 (quoting
a veteran state lobbyist as saying, “You won't ever use . . . mounds of paper at the
legislature. . . [I]f you can’t put it on one sheet of paper, it is useless”), available at 35DEC Ariz. Att’y 26 (Westlaw).
120
Cf. Pete Yost, Bush Official is Tied to Guilty Lobbyist: Procurement Chief
Accused of Hiding Abramoff’s Moves, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, May 25, 2006, at
9A (discussing a criminal prosecution where “hundreds of e-mails” between a White
House procurement officer and a lobbyist were “the focal point of the case”); Thomas B.
Edsall, E-mails Detail Dealings of Safavian, Abramhoff, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2006, at
A5 (indicating that e-mail documented “a collapse of traditional borders separating
lobbyists seeking favored treatment and government officials, including members of
Congress”).
121
Cf. Court Filing: Lawmaker Taped Taking $100,000: U.S. Rep. Jefferson’s
Comments Reportedly Recorded by FBI Informant, ASSOC. PRESS, May 21, 2006
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Consequently, there may be sufficient evidence for a factfinder to
determine whether misrepresentations of fact were culpably false.
One type of falsehood that commonly arises in the government
context is the creation of a false appearance of public approval for a
particular government action. This manufacturing of an artificial
substitute for authentic grassroots support is sometimes referred to as
“astroturfing.”122 Such misrepresentations by lobbyists are banned in
some states123 and cities. For example, a San Antonio ordinance provides
that “[a] person who lobbies . . . shall not cause any communication to be
sent to a city official in the name of any fictitious person or in the name
of any real person, except with the consent of such real person.”124
Prohibitions against false statements of fact by lobbyists can be
enforced by civil125 and criminal sanctions,126 such as fines and
mandatory bans on all lobbying activities for a period of years.127 Some
regulations also prohibit any person (including a public official or
employee) from “intentionally or knowingly . . . aid[ing] or assist[ing]
another person to engage in conduct violative of the obligations imposed
by” the laws applicable to lobbyists.128 If the false statement is contained
in a sworn filing, such as the registration statements129 or periodic
activity reports130 many lobbyists must file, that document can serve as
the basis for a perjury prosecution.131 In addition, if the false statement is

(discussing a Louisiana congressman whose conversations were recorded), available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12903856/?GT1=8199.
122
See Greg Aljer & Jessica Burnette-Lemon, Ethics in the Real World, COMM.
WORLD, Mar. 1, 2006 (discussing “astroturfing” in the lobbying context), available at
2006 WLNR 3967436 (Westlaw).
123
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(a)(5) (2004) (barring communication with
legislators under fictitious or assumed names); see also Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at
667 (indicating that some states prohibit lobbyists from “creating the false appearance of
public support for an action”).
124
See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 267(e) (2006).
125
See, e.g., id. at § 2-87(f) (discussing civil sanctions). See also Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.A. § 1606 (West 2005) (providing for enforcement of
lobbyist disclosure requirements by a civil fine of not more than $50,000).
126
See, e.g., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO §2-87(g) (discussing
criminal sanctions).
127
See, e.g., id. at § 2-87(f)(3)(a) (contemplating a sanction whereby the violator is
“prohibited from lobbying on behalf of clients before the city for a period not to exceed
three (3) years”); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-8-607(b)–(c) (2004) (prohibiting
purposeful falsehood by lobbyists, enforceable by a three-year ban from acting as a
registered lobbyist).
128
CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO §2-72.
129
Id. at § 2-65 (discussing registration of lobbyists).
130
Id. at § 2-66 (discussing quarterly activity reports).
131
Id. at § 2-87(g) (“Any person who files a false sworn statement under division 5
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part of a public filing, some laws treat each day during which the false
statement is not corrected as a new violation subject to an additional
fine.132
2. Gifts, Meals, Entertainment, and Travel
When lobbyists bestow gifts upon public servants, there is both an
actual risk and an appearance of impropriety. The risk is that the
lobbyist’s client will enjoy an unfair advantage because the offering will
induce the official or employee to make a decision calculated to repay
the favor, rather than based on the merits.133 Even if the recipient has not
been influenced by the gift, the public will perceive that the lobbyist’s
client enjoys an unfair advantage vis a vis others.134 Consequently, the
gift will diminish confidence in the government, making democracy less
effective.135
Two common types of gifts that lobbyists give to public servants are
meals and entertainment. It is difficult to see why either of these
practices should be tolerated. Where the meals or entertainment are
extravagant—as in the case of weekends at resorts,136 skybox seats,137 or
(Lobbyists) . . . is subject to criminal prosecution for perjury.”).
132
Id. at § 2-87(f)(5) (“Each day after any filing deadline imposed by division 5
(Lobbyists) . . . for which any required statement has not been filed, or for which a
statement on file is incorrect, misleading, or incomplete, constitutes a separate offense.”).
133
Cf. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Senators Vote to Forgo Lobbyist-Bought Meals, WASH.
POST, Mar. 9, 2006, at A4 (quoting Sen. Christopher Dodd as stating that “[t]here is an
undue advantage given to those who are able to take a member or senior staff member out
for a meal”).
134
Cf. Liz Austin, $700,000 Pours in for Craddick Apartment: Watchdog Groups
Say the High-Profile Donors Could Benefit in the Future, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
at 6B (stating that “watchdog groups [were] aghast” that “persons who could benefit from
future legislation,” including “[b]usinessmen, a lobbyist and a major corporate
foundation,” donated almost $700,000 to renovate the Texas House Speaker’s apartment
inside the state capitol building); Julie Mason et al., Embattled DeLay Will Quit the Race,
HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 4, 2006, at A1 (stating that a member of Congress had “been under a
near-constant ethical cloud since . . . he was shown on national TV wearing knickers and
playing golf on a trip paid for by lobbyists”); Editorial, In This Corner, Reid’s Hypocrisy:
Senate Minority Leader Accepts Boxing Tickets After Proposing A Bill That Would
Impact the Sport, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 1, 2006, at 6B (opining that “the
mere appearance of wrongdoing can be as damaging as the transgression itself”).
135
See John D. Feerick et al., Municipal Ethical Standards: The Need for a New
Approach, 10 PACE L. REV. 107, 129 (1990) (arguing that “[i]n a democracy, distrust can
be as damaging as corruption itself”); cf. Stolberg, supra note 11 (“Comprehensive
lobbying reform is the right thing to do. . . [T]o regain the trust of the American people in
this institution, we must go further than prosecuting the bad actors.” (quoting Speaker of
the House Dennis Hastert)).
136
See William Kistner & Steve Henn, The Lobbyist, AM. RADIOWORKS,
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/staffers/a1.html
(discussing
a
lobbyist—the younger brother of a congressman—who “set out to influence a $300
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trips abroad138—the ethical issues are obvious.139 Where the amounts
spent are small—as in the case of lunches during a legislative
session140—the expenditures nevertheless erode the public’s confidence
in its elected representatives. It appears that the parties footing the bills
enjoy privileged standing that is not available to others who fail to
proffer such gratuities. At the federal level, members of Congress141 and
other public officials and employees142 are paid a living wage. There is
no reason to rely on lobbyists to feed, clothe, or entertain federal public
servants. At the state and local levels, some public officials are not paid
adequately,143 but the solution to that problem is to pay them fair
compensation, not to rely on lobbyists to cover the deficiency.
Public servants should not be permitted to sell their time. While “a
steak . . . might not ‘buy’ lawmakers, . . . it’s almost certain to buy access

billion highway bill” by taking “two key congressional staffers to a celebrated resort”
where they spent the weekend with the lobbyist’s client).
137
See Fredreka Schouten & Larry Weisman, Senators Will Have to Pay for Their
Seats in Skyboxes if Ban Approved, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 2007, at 1 (stating that under
Senate rules lawmakers have long enjoyed luxury skyboxes “because the tickets often
bore no prices or were valued at below the [$50] gift limit”).
138
See, e.g., Jim Morris, Privately Sponsored Trips Hot Tickets on Capitol Hill:
Study Finds Almost $50 Million Spent on Travel For Lawmakers, Aides, CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY,
June
5,
2006,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/powertrips/report.aspx?aid=799# (discussing the former
House majority whip’s $28,000 golf trip to Scotland, which was sponsored by a lobbyist
who later pleaded guilty to fraud, conspiracy and tax evasion).
139
See REMINI, supra note 56, at 480 (noting scandals between 1975 and 1990
where federal officers “were guilty of accepting personal gifts . . . and other gratuities
such as luxury hotel accommodations, golf outings and the like”). The problems posed by
extravagant meals and entertainment are similar to those posed by large expenditures in
political campaigns. See Thurber, supra note 12, at 153 (discussing how the “amount of
issue advertising expenditures can dwarf the input from constituents and less well-funded
groups” and result in “a narrowing of public policy options because only those groups
that have sufficient resources are heard”).
140
Cf. Scharrer, supra note 43, at 1A (quoting a former Texas state legislator as
saying, “[y]ou can walk into the Legislature any day and watch when they break for
lunch. . . . [L]egislators look up to the gallery and just point to a lobbyist—‘Take me to
lunch.’”).
141
“The current salary for rank-and-file members of the House and Senate is
$165,200 per year.” Salaries and Benefits of U.S. Congress Members,
http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/aa031200a.htm.
142
U.S. OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT., SALARIES AND WAGES: 2006 SALARY TABLES
AND RELATED INFORMATION (2006), http://www.opm.gov/oca/06tables/index.asp.
143
In San Antonio, Texas, city council members receive no salary and are paid a
mere $20 for attending each council meeting. See Vincent R. Johnson, A Well-Run City
Worth the Cost, May 9, 2004, SAN ANTONIO-EXPRESS-NEWS, at 5H (supporting a
proposed city charter amendment to pay salaries to members of city council; the
amendment failed).
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[to them].”144 Recent figures for the Texas legislature show that
“[s]pending on food, entertainment, and gifts . . . [amounted] to about
$15,900 worth of perks for each of the 181 lawmakers—more than
double their $7,200-a-year salary.”145 Until recently, many members of
Congress flew on corporate jets at heavily discounted rates, “a practice
that gives precious access to lobbyists, who often go along for the
trip.”146 Such “[t]rips ‘violate the principle of fairness. In order to get this
special kind of access, you have to pay a lot of money.’”147 Recently, the
House148 and Senate149 banned such travel. The public is right to be
concerned about gifts to public officials and their staff members, for “[a]
review of thousands of state records shows legislation is often introduced
by powerful lawmakers after lobbyists spend lavishly on their campaigns
and entertain them.”150
The best practice151 is to ban gifts from lobbyists entirely. A total
ban is easy to understand and enforce. However, total bans on gifts are
extremely difficult to enact or continue in force. According to the Better
Government Association, more than half of the states have not enacted
any restrictions on gifts, trips, and honoraria given by lobbyists.152 When
the funds originate with lobbyists, only six states have banned all gifts,
only six states have banned all trips, and only three states have banned all

144
Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (quoting Robert Stern, president of the
nonpartisan Center for Governmental Studies in California).
145
Id.
146
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Approves Lobbying Limits by Wide Margin, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006, at A1 (discussing a bill that failed to “rein in” use of corporate
jets). See also BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE
AMERICAN DREAM 137–38 (2006) (discussing the comforts enjoyed by politicians flying
on private jets).
147
See Morris, supra note 138 (quoting Professor Dennis Thompson of Harvard
University).
148
See Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R., 110th Cong. XXV, cl.5 (2007),
available at http://www.rules.house.gov/ruleprec/110th.pdf; see also H. Res. 6, 110th
Cong.
§§
205–08
(2007)
(enacted),
available
at
http://www.rules.house.gov/110/text/110_Hres6.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2007);
Kirkpatrick, Senate Feels Heat, supra note 9 (stating that the new House rules “ban
lawmakers from using corporate jets and reimbursing the owners”).
149
See Kirkpatrick, supra note 8 (discussing the reform).
150
Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (discussing lobbying in Texas).
151
See BGA INTEGRITY INDEX, supra note 101, at 26 (stating that a statute
implementing “best practices” would provide, among other things, that “state officers and
employees are prohibited from accepting any gifts/trips/honoraria from lobbyists”);
Editorial, What Real Reform Looks Like, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 12, 2006, at B8
[hereinafter Real Reform] (“True reform would totally ban gifts and privately paid travel;
if a trip is worth taking to do the people’s business, it’s worth the people paying for it.”).
152
See BGA INTEGRITY INDEX, supra note 101 app. Gifts, Trips and Honoraria
Detail.
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honoraria.153 In some states, local restrictions are more stringent than
state limitations. Yet, even where such variation is permitted by state
law,154 there is often a lack of political resolve to enact restrictions. At
the federal level, the House recently passed a total ban on gifts from
lobbyists,155 but a similar ban had been the law just a decade earlier,156
only to be jettisoned for more lenient rules when that was politically
feasible. The recent House reform was quickly followed by a similar
reform in the Senate.157
Absent a total ban, a dollar limitation can be imposed on gifts from
lobbyists.158 Such a restriction can be enforced through disclosure
requirements that compel recipients159 or their lobbyist-donors160 to
reveal the source, nature, and value of gifts.161 However, disclosure is not
a panacea. A study of privately funded congressional travel found that
disclosure forms were often too vague or incomplete to determine
whether the trip was legitimate.162
To be effective, a dollar limitation on gifts, trips, and honoraria

153

See id.
“Many state gift laws also cover local officials and employees. Some states
permit local jurisdictions to impose restrictions more stringent than under state law. Other
states leave local gift regulation entirely to local governments and agencies.” Nielsen et
al., supra note 3, at 633.
155
See Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R., 110th Cong. XXV, cl.5 (2007);
Kirkpatrick, Senate Feels Heat, supra note 9 (reporting that “[t]he new House rules bar
members from taking gifts, meals or trips paid for by lobbyists, or the organizations that
employ them”).
156
See Jane Hook, Lobbyists Still Cozy Up, Even With Gift Ban, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
10, 1996, at 1 (indicating that under the earlier House rules “members and their staffs
generally . . . [could not] accept gifts from anyone but family and friends,” although there
were complicated exceptions); David Jackson, Congress May Lift Gift Ban for Party
Conventions, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1996 (stating that under the strict House rules,
members could “accept no gifts or meals. Not a pencil or a pad of paper.”).
157
See Kirkpatrick, supra note 8 (discussing the change).
158
See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO §
2-67(i) (2006) (providing that “[a] person who lobbies . . . shall not give gifts to a City
official or a City employee or his or her immediate family, save and except for (1) items
received that are of nominal value; or (2) meals in an individual expense of $50 or less at
any occurrence, and no more than a cumulative value of $500 in a single calendar year,
from a single source . . ., or (3) other gifts” specifically permitted by a general rule on
gifts).
159
See, e.g., id. at § 2-74(n) (requiring city council members and others to disclose
in writing gifts worth more than $100, with certain exceptions).
160
See, e.g., id. at § 2-66(a)(6) (requiring lobbyists to disclose in writing gifts to city
officials greater than $50 in value, with certain exceptions).
161
See BGA INTEGRITY INDEX, supra note 101, at 26 (recommending that in state
government, “[a]ll gifts/trips/honoraria valued more than $10 received from lobbyists
must be disclosed”).
162
See Morris, supra note 138.
154
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must be low. The Better Government Association uses a scoring system
for rating integrity in state government. A state receives a score of zero if
it has no cap; a score of 1 if the cap is above $250; a score of 2 if the cap
is between $100 and $250; a score of 3 if the cap is below $100; and the
highest score of 4 if the state has a total ban.163 In each of three
categories, (gifts, trips, and honoraria) a majority of the states received a
score of zero.164 It is also important for rules limiting gifts to public
officials to define the list of restricted gifts broadly to include any type of
benefit with pecuniary value165— i.e. loans and the like.166 Otherwise, it
will be possible to circumvent the ban through artful planning.
In comparison to an outright ban, a rule with dollar limitations and
disclosure requirements is further hampered by the subtle temptations
posed by gifts. More than half a century ago, former Senator Paul
Douglas correctly observed that “[w]hat happens is a gradual shifting of
a man’s loyalties from the community to those who have been doing him
favors.”167 As Douglas explained, “[t]hroughout this whole process the
official will claim—and may indeed believe—that there is no causal
connection between the favors he has received and the decisions which
he makes.”168 Thus, the “whole process may be so subtle as not to be
detected by the official himself.”169
Beyond the issue of whether there is political resolve to limit gifts
from lobbyists lies an important issue of equitable dimensions. That issue
is the question of how to define a “lobbyist” for purposes of applying the
rule. Does the term “lobbyist” only refer to someone who is paid to
petition the government on behalf of another, or does the term also
include persons who volunteer their services to represent others, or even
individuals who act on their own behalf in petitioning the government?170
163

See BGA INTEGRITY INDEX, supra note 101, at 25–26.
Id. at app. Gifts, Trips and Honoraria Detail.
165
However, state lobbyist codes often contain exceptions. “Recognizing the
‘incidental’ nature or ‘public benefit’ of certain gifts, many laws exempt simple meals,
token items or mementos, tickets to social, charitable or political events, randomly
selected prizes, educational or fact-finding trips, and certain other things of minimum
value from the definition of a ‘gift.’” Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 669.
166
Cf. REMINI, supra note 56, at 424 (reporting that, during the 1970s, a proposal in
the House to investigate bank lobbyists was voted down because it would have
embarrassed a member of Congress who was the “lucky beneficiary of more than
$100,000 in relatively unsecured loans from half a dozen banks”).
167
Cox, supra note 71, at 291–92 (citing PAUL H. DOUGLAS, ETHICS IN
GOVERNMENT 44 (1952)).
168
Id. at 292.
169
Id.
170
For purposes of lobbyist regulations, sometimes a person who might logically be
considered a “client” is deemed to be a “lobbyist.” See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF
ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-62(g) (2006) (“If an agent or employee engages
164
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What good reason could justify allowing individual citizens or volunteer
surrogates seeking to influence legislation or official decisions to give
gifts to public servants, if paid surrogates are restricted from freely doing
so? Should not the same rules apply to each type of actor? There is a
serious risk that a rule drafted too narrowly will be circumvented. For
example, although lobbyists are now prohibited from paying for travel by
members of Congress, their clients may do so if the trip is connected to
the members’ official duties.171 A recent study showed that during a sixyear period, “[p]rivate groups, corporations or trade associations—many
with legislation that could affect them pending before Congress—paid
nearly $50 million . . . to send members of Congress and their staffers on
at least 23,000 trips overseas and within the United States.”172
Gifts (including meals, travel, and entertainment) given by
individuals or entities are arguably just as pernicious as gifts from paid
lobbyists. Yet prohibiting such gratuities may be difficult or impossible.
A rule of such breadth would be even more difficult to enact than one
that applies only to paid lobbyists. Politicians opposed to ethics reform
often propose such wide-reaching rules, knowing they cannot be
enacted.173 In addition, enforcing a ban on gifts given to public servants
by any person in the community may necessitate considerably broader
enforcement mechanisms than a rule targeting only paid lobbyists.
Similar issues arise with respect to the rules governing false
statements of fact,174 but perhaps not as sharply. The fact that paid
lobbyists are formally prevented from knowingly or recklessly lying does
not imply that such conduct is permissible on the part of others. Lying is
malum in se.175 Moreover, few persons would seek to circumvent the ban
on lobbyist falsity by lying to public servants personally. In contrast, a
ban on gifts from lobbyists might imply that gifts from others are
permissible. Such conduct is merely malum prohibitum,176 not malum in
in lobbying for a principal or employer, both the agent and the principal, or the employee
and the employer, are lobbyists.”).
171
See Philip Shenon, Firm Says House Lawyers Approved Payments for Trips,
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2005, at A13 (discussing congressional trips paid for by lobbyists’
clients).
172
James Kuhnhenn, Study: Millions Spent on Trips for Congress, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, June 6, 2006, at A4 (citing a study conducted by the Center for Public
Integrity, American Public Media, and Northwestern University’s Medill News Service).
173
Ben Smith, Legislature 2004: Amendments Put Ethics Bill in Danger, ATLANTA
J. CONST., Mar. 16, 2004, at D1 (discussing approval of an ethics bill in the Georgia
Senate with amendments “so strict and potentially unconstitutional” that it “stood little
chance of passage in the House”).
174
See discussion supra subpart III.A.1.
175
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 978 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “malum in se” as a
“crime or an act that is inherently immoral”).
176
See id. (defining “malum prohibitum” as “[a]n act that is a crime merely because
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se. In addition, it is foreseeable that a client might seek to avoid the ban
by making gifts personally or through a volunteer.177 Obviously, these
issues are complex, and more will be said below about the challenges of
defining the term “lobbyist.”178
Another important question related to rules banning gifts is which
public servants should be subject to the ban. Studies of privately funded
congressional travel show that “[a]lmost three-quarters of all trips were
taken” not by members of Congress but “by aides, who often influence
how their bosses vote, negotiate in committee and interact with other
government officials.”179 It might reasonably be urged that lobbyists
should be prohibited from giving gifts to any public official or employee,
including staff members, on the assumption that, if the gift is given, the
lobbyist believes there is an advantage to be obtained. However, “many
states have elaborate ethics statutes specifically proscribing [which]
officials are covered.”180 Such laws create exemptions from coverage that
are unwise and reflect a lack of political will on the part of lawmakers to
effectively address the dangers associated with gratuities. The new
House Rules wisely frame their ban on gifts from lobbyists in broad
terms that apply not just to members, but to any employee of the
House.181
Cynics can argue with historical accuracy that public life has never
been free from gifts by lobbyists to public officials.182 In the nineteenth
century, legislators rode the trains for free, “courtesy of railroad
lobbyists.”183 However, history is no justification for failing to improve
the laws. During the past century, great progress was made in improving
it is prohibited by statute, although the act itself is not necessarily immoral”).
177
See Birnbaum, Lobbyists, supra note 12 (quoting an individual affiliated with a
major lobbying firm as stating that “[i]f meals [paid for by lobbyists] are heavily
restricted, we’re likely to see executives from the home office picking up checks because
they’re not lobbyists”).
178
See discussion infra subpart III.B.1.
179
Morris, supra note 138.
180
Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 668.
181
Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R., 110th Cong. XXV, cl.5(a)(1)(A)(ii)
(2007), available at http://www.rules.house.gov/ruleprec/110th.pdf (providing that “[a]
Member, Delegate, Resident Commissioner, officer, or employee of the House may not
knowingly accept a gift from a registered lobbyist . . . or from a private entity that retains
or employs registered lobbyists or agents of a foreign principal except as provided in
subparagraph (3) of this paragraph”).
182
See BERRY, supra note 40, at 48 (arguing that “[i]n spite of numerous reforms
throughout our history, ‘interested money’ has always found its way to receptive
legislators”). Recently, members of Congress have received huge advances on book
contracts from large corporations with interests before Congress. Id. “While Congress
forbade bribery of judges in 1790, bribing a legislator was not illegal until 1853.” Cf.
GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 692
183
BERRY, supra note 40, at 48.
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the position of the poor, the disabled, immigrants, women, minorities,
employees, and consumers through laws that addressed the needs of
those groups and that were more fair than those previously in existence.
Ethics in government is now accorded a higher priority than at any time
in American history.184 By passing laws that ban or limit gifts from
lobbyists to public officials or employees, legislators will help to ensure
that all voices will be heard by public representatives on equal terms. It is
important to continually reform the laws in a quest for a more just
society.
When restrictions on gifts, entertainment, and travel are enacted, the
money that would have been spent on those gratuities may be used to
advance the interests of lobbyists’ clients in other ways. “[I]ndustries and
interest groups have [already] turned to more sophisticated tactics. . . .
[Lobbyists] are increasing their campaign contributions, widening their
use of the Internet to stir voter activism, and donating large sums to think
tanks and charities affiliated with” members of the House or Senate.185
However, that redirection of funds may further the interests of
democracy if those expenditures result in a more transparent and open
political process. For example, it might be a desirable development for
“The Business Roundtable, which represents big-business chieftains, . .
[to embrace] a new technique of advertising on Web sites for grassroots
advocates.”186 The goal behind regulating gifts from lobbyists is to
remove impediments to political discourse and even-handed decision
making, not to discourage individuals from pursuing innovative ways to
petition the government.
3. Campaign Contributions and Fundraising
The great exception to limitations on gifts by lobbyists is lawful
campaign contributions made or orchestrated by lobbyists. Campaign
money often dwarfs lobbyists’ expenditures on gratuities such as meals,
travel, and entertainment.187 Like gifts, those contributions can be a way
184

Cf. Cox, supra note 71, at 281 (“For twenty years or more, extraordinary public
attention has been focused upon the ethics of government officials.”).
185
Birnbaum, Lobbyists, supra note 12.
186
However, the same cannot be said where “organizations from the left and right
are increasingly offering meetings with top government officials in exchange for hefty
dues.” Id.
187
See Thurber, supra note 12, at 156 (stating that in the 2000 election cycle, “the
top twenty-five lobbying firms spent over $4 million”). “Many of the top twenty-five . . .
firms also contributed services (either in-kind or for a fee), such as strategic advice about
finance, media, and grassroots activities, directly to the 2000 presidential and
congressional campaigns.” Id. at 157. See also Anne E. Kornblutt et al., The Abramoff
Case: The Overview, Lobbyist Accepts Plea Deal and Becomes Star Witness in a Wider
Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2006, at A1 (discussing a lobbyist who “helped
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to buy access to legislators188 and perhaps votes.189 In some cases,
“[r]egular contributors attend dozens of fund-raisers a year and become
part of the ‘circuit’ of lobbyists around a cadre of lawmakers and their
committees . . . . Contacts are made, relationships formed, and networks
established.”190 Occasionally, the intent of a contribution is blatant. In
1995, an Ohio congressman “passed [campaign contribution] checks
from tobacco lobbyists to other congressmen on the House floor while
lawmakers were considering ending a tobacco subsidy.”191
Not surprisingly, some states impose special limitations on
campaign donations by lobbyists. Kentucky has a flat ban on campaign
contributions.192 Alaska provides a slight exception to its ban when the
lobbyist’s contribution goes to the candidate from the district where the
lobbyist will be eligible to vote on election day.193 Austin, Texas, bars
lobbyists’ contributions greater than $25 to members of the city
council.194 The County of Los Angeles prohibits any contributions to
county officials or candidates by persons who are presently or were,
within the previous twelve months, registered as county lobbyists.195
funnel more than $1.5 million in campaign donations to hundreds of elected officials”).
188
See WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 43, at 50 (stating that contributions create
access to legislators for lobbyists).
189
See Jennifer McKee, Burns Did About-Face After Cash from Lobbyist,
MISSOULIAN, Dec. 3, 2005, at A1 (asserting that records show that a U.S. senator from
Montana “changed his stance on a 2001 bill after receiving a $5,000 donation from a
lobbyist’s client who opposed the legislation”), available at 2005 WLNR 22479128
(Westlaw); cf. Hardball with Chris Matthews (CNBC television broadcast Sept. 28,
2005) (indicating that the House Ethics Committee admonished a Texas Congressman for
“inviting energy lobbyists to a fund-raiser just before the energy bill was brought to the
House floor”), available at 2005 WLNR 15339714 (Westlaw).
190
WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 43, at 50.
191
Bart Mills, In Washington, It’s Now About Who Cheated the Least, LIMA NEWS
(Ohio), Jan. 19, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 1039973 (Westlaw). See also Editorial,
A Hazy Culture, BLADE (Toledo, Ohio), Mar. 6, 2006, (discussing campaign
contributions from the tobacco industry), available at 2006 WLNR 3837524 (Westlaw).
192
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.811(6) (West 2004) (“A legislative agent shall not
make a campaign contribution to a legislator, a candidate, or his campaign committee.”).
193
ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.074(g) (2004).
194
AUSTIN, TEX., AUSTIN CITY CODE § 2-2-9 (2006) (“[N]o person who is
compensated to lobby the city council . . . and no spouse of any such person may
contribute more than $25 in a campaign period to an officeholder or candidate for mayor
or city council, or to a specific purpose political committee involved in an election for
mayor or city council.”).
195
See LOS ANGELES, CAL., COUNTY CODE § 2-190.130 (2006), available at
http://municipalcodes.lexisnexis.com/codes/lacounty (follow “Title 2. Administration”
hyperlink; then follow “Chapter 2.190 Political Campaigns for County Offices”
hyperlink; then follow “2.190.130 Lobbyist contributions” hyperlink) (providing in part
that “[n]o person or firm who is registered . . . as a county lobbyist or county lobbying
firm or who has been so registered at any time in the previous 12 months shall make any
contribution to any county official or candidate for county office”).
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Several states also prohibit lobbyists from attempting to influence the
votes of legislators by promising financial support for the member’s
candidacy, or by threatening to contribute financially to an opponent.196
Unfortunately, laws in a number of states dilute the effectiveness of their
restrictions by providing that a ban on campaign contributions applies
only when the legislature is in session.197 These half-hearted reform
efforts seem to assume that either legislators or voters have very short
attention spans.
Some lobbyists solicit contributions and hold fundraisers for
candidates on behalf of clients seeking government contracts.198 As
recently as the summer of 2006, the (now-former) House majority leader
held “fund-raisers at lobbyists’ offices.”199 This conduct creates the
perception “that these lobbyists may enjoy differential access and may
have unfair advantages over others who are not participating in candidate
events and fundraisers.”200 In some states, such conduct by lobbyists is
unlawful. For example, Alaska provides, with limited exceptions, that a
lobbyist may not host a fundraising event or otherwise engage in the
fundraising activity of a legislative campaign or campaign for governor
or lieutenant governor.201 In South Carolina, the rule applies to both
196

See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-1492(3), (5) (LexisNexis 2002)
(prohibiting such conduct by “any person”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-47.5(b) (2005)
(stating that “no person” shall violate the rule).
197
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-105.5(1)(I) (2005) (“No professional
lobbyist, volunteer lobbyist, or principal . . . shall make or promise to make a contribution
to, or solicit or promise to solicit a contribution for . . . [a] member of the general
assembly or candidate for the general assembly, when the general assembly is in regular
session.”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 68A.504(1) (West 2006) (stating a similar rule including,
“in the case of the governor or a gubernatorial candidate, . . . the thirty days following the
adjournment of a regular legislative session allowed for the signing of bills”); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 218.942(9)(a)–(c) (LexisNexis 2005) (stating a similar rule including short
periods before and after legislative sessions).
198
COMMISSION ON ETHICS AND PUBLIC TRUST, A COMMUNITY’S RESOLVE TO
RESTORE INTEGRITY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC TRUST: THE MIAMI-DADE EXPERIENCE
(1996–PRESENT) (Jan. 2004), at 8–9 [hereinafter MIAMI-DADE EXPERIENCE].
199
Mike McIntire, New House Majority Leader Keeps Old Ties to Lobbyists, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2006, at A1.
200
MIAMI-DADE EXPERIENCE, supra note 198, at 9.
201
ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(a)(8) (2004). Maryland has extensive rules relating to
fundraising and political activities by lobbyists. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 15713(14)(i)–(iii) (LexisNexis 2004) (providing that a lobbyist shall not, “if serving on the
State or a local central committee of a political party, participate: (i) as an officer of the
central committee; (ii) in fund-raising activity on behalf of the political party; or (iii) in
actions relating to filling a vacancy in a public office”); id. at § 15-714(d)(1)(i)–(v)
(stating that a lobbyist may not, with respect to a number of state offices, engage in “(i)
soliciting or transmitting a political contribution from any person, including a political
committee; (ii) serving on a fund-raising committee or a political committee; (iii) acting
as a treasurer for a candidate or official or as treasurer or chairman of a political
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lobbyists and their principals.202 Miami Beach, Florida “bans lobbyists
from serving as fundraisers if they actively lobby the city.”203
Some lobbying firms have formed their own political action
committees (PACs), which presumably are more effective at achieving
their clients’ goals.204 However, PACs have the added advantage of
making the sources of campaign donations less clear to political
watchdogs.205 Such conduct appears to run afoul of laws prohibiting
lobbyists from directly or indirectly collecting contributions for a
candidate.206
The need to finance political campaigns is no reason for failing to
address the problems raised by lobbyist contributions.207 “Full public
financing of campaigns, approved in three states for legislative and
statewide races, is considered by many watchdogs to be the best way to
end the campaign money hunt that empowers lobbyists as it drives
candidates.”208
4. Revolving-Door Employment
Perhaps no problem in government ethics is easier to understand, or
more difficult to address effectively, than that posed by “revolving-door
employment.”209 The risk is obvious that a client represented by a publicservant-turned-lobbyist will have, or will appear to have, an unfair
committee; (iv) organizing or establishing a political committee for the purpose of
soliciting or transmitting contributions from any person; or (v) forwarding tickets for
fund-raising activities, or other solicitations for political contributions, to a potential
contributor”).
202
See S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 2-17-110(F) (2005) (“A lobbyist, a lobbyist’s
principal, or a person acting on behalf of a lobbyist or a lobbyist’s principal may not host
events to raise funds for public officials. No public official may solicit [those persons] to
host a fundraising event for the public official.”).
203
MIAMI-DADE EXPERIENCE, supra note 198, at 9.
204
See Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (quoting one lobbyist as complaining
that the political action committees of influential lobbying firms “shut out other lobbyists,
creating in effect a cartel”).
205
See id. (quoting a representative of Texans for Public Justice as stating that such
practices “really muddle the source”).
206
ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(a)(8).
207
See discussion supra subpart III.A.2.
208
Peggy Fikac, “Clean Elections” Might Wash Away Money’s Imprint, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 15, 2006, at 1A (“Once you kind of end the money chase,
elected officials are far less susceptible to some of the attractions that lobbyists can offer
–i.e., travel, food, gifts, campaign contributions.” (quoting Mary Boyle of Common
Cause)).
209
See generally Editorial, The Capitol’s Revolting Door, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2005, at A26 [hereinafter Revolting Door] (discussing “Washington’s ever-whirring
carousel for business lobbyists and government appointees, who spin back and forth
between the private and public sectors in a blur of opportunism”).
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advantage in petitioning the government.210 This type of conduct poses a
significant threat to the integrity of democratic institutions.
Consequently, Congress211 and a number of state legislatures212 have
enacted laws addressing revolving-door employment. Indeed, even
cities,213 including some with otherwise weak ethics codes,214 commonly
have revolving-door limitations prohibiting former public officials or
employees from “representing” private parties before the government for
specified periods of time. Depending on how the relevant terms are
defined, these city ordinances may treat lobbying as a form of
“representation” and thus limit revolving-door lobbying.215 Yet, despite
210

See Capps, supra note 40, at 1886 (“Critics claim that the flood of legislators
into lobbying heightens the perception that lobbyists use personal contacts to take home
big paychecks, and that taxpayers pay the price in the end.”).
211
See Minor & Regan, supra note 2, at §§ 10.52–.53 (discussing federal laws that
restrict lobbying by former public officials and employees).
212
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(c) (2004) (providing, with limited
exceptions, that “[a] former member of the legislature may not engage in activity as a
lobbyist before the legislature for a period of one year after the former member has left
the legislature”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1233(2) (2004) (providing that no person
shall “[l]obby the legislature for compensation within one year after the person ceases to
be a member of the senate or house of representatives”). But see LOBBYING, PACS, AND
CAMPAIGN FINANCE, supra note 3, at §§ 31.52–.53 (stating that New Hampshire does not
restrict the employment of former public officials or employees); §§ 35.52–.53 (stating
that North Carolina has no restrictions on employment of former public officials and
employees).
213
See, e.g., DALLAS, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS § 12A-14 (2006) (limiting subsequent
representation of private interests); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF
SAN ANTONIO § 2-56 (2006) (similar restrictions). For example, a former appointed board
member might be prohibited only from representing persons for compensation before the
same board, but a former elected city council member might be prohibited from
representing any person before any city body. See id. at § 2-57. See Johnson, America’s
Preoccupation, supra note 73, at 745–47 (discussing key variables). See generally Mark
Davies, Keeping the Faith: A Model Local Ethics Law–Content and Commentary, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 61, 75–76 (1993) (finding that city prohibitions are typically short in
duration (one or two years) and vary in terms of who is subject to the restrictions, what
types of governmental contact are prohibited, and whether the ban applies only to
compensated representation).
214
See, e.g., SAN JOSE, CAL., SAN JOSÉ MUNICIPAL CODE § 12.10.030 (2006)
(establishing “revolving door” restrictions).
215
The City of San Antonio, Texas, passed a new ethics code in 1998. As enacted,
the code restricted, for a period of time, “representation” of private interests by former
city officials and employees. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN
ANTONIO § 2-56 (1998). That rule clearly limited lobbying by former officials and
employees, for the code, as adopted, included a definition stating that:
“Representation” encompasses all forms of communication and personal appearances in
which a person, not acting in performance of official duties, formally or informally serves
as an advocate for private interests. Lobbying, even on an informal basis, is a form of
representation . Representation does not include appearance as a witness in litigation or
other official proceedings. Id. at § 2-42 (emphasis added). By 2006, the definition of
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such restrictions at all levels of government, “[s]ome of the most
successful [lobbyists] are former lawmakers[,] or former aides to
lawmakers[,] who cycle in and out of government.”216
The problem with most restrictions on revolving-door employment
is that they apply for too short a period of time.217 For example, with
respect to lobbying by former state legislators, six states only require a
two-year moratorium, twenty states have only a one-year moratorium,
and one state has a mere six month moratorium.218 Other states have no
revolving-door restrictions at all.219 Retired or defeated members of
Congress “must sit out one year before doing active lobbying, although
they can offer ‘guidance’ at up to $500,000 a year.”220 Needless to say,
the connections legislators accrue during years of service often last far
longer than a year or two. This is particularly true at the federal level,
where turnover in Congress is minimal due to careful redistricting that
aggressively protects incumbents.221
“representation” had been gutted by an amendment, so that it now reads simply:
“‘Representation’ is a presentation of fact—either by words or by conduct—made to
induce someone to act. Representation does not include appearance as a witness in
litigation or other official proceedings.” SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE
CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-42(bb) (2006). The revised definition makes it much less clear
that the representation rule bars lobbying, and to that extent substantially weakens the
San Antonio ethics code.
216
Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70. Some argue that lobbyists with prior
experience in government are an asset to the American political system. “Federal policymakers, awash in a flood of competing voices, need reliable information; to the extent
that their government experience fosters such reliability, these [lobbyists] better inform
decision making.” Kevin T. McGuire, Lobbyists, Revolving Doors and the U.S. Supreme
Court, 16 J. L. & POL. 113, 135–36 (2000).
217
However, in some circumstances, provisions can be too broad. A rule may, for
example, expect an improper degree of continuing “loyalty” from one who served in
government only as a volunteer member of a board or commission by imposing
restrictions on subsequent activities that have no relationship to the volunteer’s limited
range of service in government. See Johnson, Ethics in Government, supra note 69, at
737–38 (“It is reasonable to expect a higher degree of loyalty from one who is elected to
city office or on the payroll than from a person who has merely agreed to donate a few
hours of service to the work of the government on an occasional basis by serving on a
board or commission . . . [The] legitimate expectation of loyalty from a citizen-volunteer
generally extends no further than the scope of the volunteer’s official duties.”).
218
CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, STATE LEGISLATOR REVOLVING DOOR PROVISIONS
(Mar. 1, 2006), http://www.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/report.aspx?aid=783.
219
See Fikac, supra note 208 (stating that Texas is one of twenty-three states with
“no prohibition against legislators lobbying state government after they leave office”).
220
Real Reform, supra note 151. See generally Minor & Regan, supra note 2, at §
10.52 (“Under a federal criminal statute and congressional rules, Members of Congress
may not lobby any Member, officer, or employee of Congress for one year after leaving
office.”) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 207(e)–(f); Senate Rule 37 §§ 8–9).
221
See Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went
Wrong in the Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L. J. 179, 179
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Revolving-door limitations on lobbyists can be strengthened in a
variety of ways. The length of the ban can be increased (a two-year ban
is stronger than a one-year restriction222); the number of persons subject
to the ban can be broadened (a ban that applies to all government
officials223 is more potent than one that applies only within the legislative
branch224); and the ban can be made more extensive with respect to
matters in which the former public servant was closely involved (e.g., a
rule might prohibit lobbying for a longer period of time with respect to
matters in which the former official or employee “personally and
substantially” participated225).
Some reformers also advocate placing limits on the ability of
lobbyists to be appointed to positions in government. For example,
during recent efforts to strengthen the law in Georgia an amendment was
proposed that would have prevented “the appointment of lobbyists for
one year following the expiration of the lobbyist’s registration ‘to any
state office, board, authority, commission, or bureau’ that regulates the
activities of a firm on whose behalf they had lobbied.”226 The City of
Austin, Texas, prohibits lobbyists from being appointed to a “cityestablished board, commission, or committee within three years of
engaging in lobbying activity.”227 As a matter of public policy, these
(2003) (arguing that “the “2001-2002 Round of Congressional Redistricting was the most
incumbent-friendly in modern American history” because new district lines insulated
incumbents from competition and “froze into place . . . a ‘distributional bias’ that gives
Republicans a roughly 50-seat head start in the battle for control of Congress”).
222
Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1233(2) (2004) (stating a one-year
limitation), with KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.811(8) (West 2004) (prohibiting legislators
from serving as lobbyists for two years). See also Birnbaum, Lobbyists, supra note 12
(discussing proposed federal legislation to increase a one-year ban to two years).
223
See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 242(u) (2006) (defining city “officials” for purposes of the city ethics code, including its
revolving-door provisions, as the mayor, members of city council, municipal judges and
magistrates, and many others).
224
See Lisa Berman, Change in New Jersey Lobby Law Inspires Firm Subsidiary,
27 NAT’L L.J. 10 (2006) (discussing how old regulations, which required lobbyists to
register if they “wanted to influence regulations or legislation,” were broadened in New
Jersey to include “attempts to affect administrative and bureaucratic decisions in the
executive branch”).
225
“Under the 1978 Ethics in Government Act, top executive branch officials are
barred, for one year after leaving government, from representing anyone before their
former agency; officials are permanently barred from lobbying on issues that are directly
related to their former areas of responsibility.” GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 718.
“Cabinet-level employees are subject to a more extensive prohibition that covers
lobbying communications throughout the executive branch.” Minor & Regan, supra note
2, at § 10.53 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 207(d)).
226
Stephanie D. Campanella, et al., Election: Georgia Ethics in Government Act, 21
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 129, 137 (2004) (discussing a failed effort to reform state ethics laws).
227
AUSTIN, TEX., AUSTIN CITY CODE § 2-1-8 (2006).
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regulations make good sense. The underlying concern is similar to an
“administrative capture” scenario, where an administrative agency is
dominated by those it is supposed to regulate228 and becomes less
effective as a result.229 By limiting the ease with which lobbyists are able
to move into appointed governmental positions, revolving-door
limitations preserve a healthy distance between those who seek the aid of
government and those who make decisions.230
The general brevity and limited scope of existing revolving-door
restrictions reflect present (although not necessarily inevitable) political
realities. Consequently, stronger revolving-door limitations will likely
appear at the margins, rather than through sweeping changes to existing
practices.231 Even so, there is reason to hope that, at the federal level,
former members of Congress who become lobbyists will be banned from
engaging in the most blatant practices, such as lobbying current members
on the House floor or in the House gym and dining room.232
5. Contingent-Fee Lobbying
Some
threats to
contingent
contrast to

lobbyist compensation arrangements pose more serious
the public interest than others. A lobbyist whose fee is
on success has a greater incentive to “win at all costs,” in
lobbyists who are paid an hourly fee, a lump-sum fee, or a

228
See Ian Ayres & F. Clayton Miller, “I’ll Sell It to You at Cost”: Legal Methods
to Promote Retail Markup Disclosure, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1070 & n.87 (1990)
(“Regulated agencies . . . can be ‘captured’ by the very firms they are mandated to
regulate. Captured agencies have been the source of many inefficient regulations.”).
229
See Christopher Wyeth Kirkham, Note, Busting the Administrative Trust: An
Experimentalist Approach to Universal Service Administration in Telecommunications
Policy, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 620, 623 (1998) (“Administrative capture by special interests
leads to policy approaches that often fail to account for the interests of the less influential
public.”). Administrative capture may occur as a result of revolving-door movement
between the private and public sectors. See Johnson, Liberating Progress, supra note 93,
at 1051–52 (“The risks that agency determinations may unfairly favor the interests of the
companies seeking regulatory approval are all the more ominous in view of the revolving
door between government work and the private sector, which tempts agency employees
to render decisions which may enhance their own employment chances with the same
regulated firms they are charged with overseeing.”).
230
Cf. Laura Mansnerus, A Shadowy Web of State Agencies and Developers, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 2005, at 14 NJ 1 (discussing the questionable use of the appointment
process in New Jersey to forge connections between state government and private
enterprise). ‘We put developers on boards who take care of other developers who sit on
other boards who then take care of them,’ said Jeff Tittel, the director of the state chapter
of the Sierra Club.” Id.
231
But see Real Reform, supra note 151 (“True reform would . . . forbid former
members of Congress—or their spouses—from sliding over into lobbying jobs.”).
232
Id. (arguing for the elimination of “sweetheart deal[s] that allow[] former
members access to the House floor and privileges in the House gym and dining room”).
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monthly retainer.233 As a result, contingent fee arrangements may
promote the use of “improper means, such as distorting relevant facts, to
ensure success.”234 Contingent fees, or “success fees,”235 may also overcompensate lobbyists.236
In personal-injury tort litigation, contingent fees pose similar
problems. A lawyer who will not be paid unless his or her client wins has
a strong desire to prevail regardless of the facts unearthed during
litigation. Nevertheless, contingent fee representation of personal injury
claimants is widely permitted.237 Such arrangements for financing the
costs of legal services play an important role in ensuring that all injured
persons, particularly the poor, will have equal access to the courts.238
While contingent-fee legal representation may be a type of social
“evil”—in the sense that it may result in overzealous lawyering or overcompensation—it is also a socially beneficial “necessary evil.”
The same is not true with respect to lobbying. Relatively few
lobbyists represent consumers and nonprofit organizations,239 and even
fewer serve the poor or disadvantaged.240 Contingent-fee lobbying is
more likely to promote the interests of big business, for business-related

233
See Chwat, supra note 41, at 121–22 (discussing hourly rates and monthly
retainers).
234
City of Hialeah Gardens v. John L. Adams & Co., Inc., 599 So. 2d 1322, 1324–
26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that there “is a legitimate public policy concern”
and calling the issue “to the attention of the Bench and Bar”).
235
See Capps, supra note 40, at 1887 (demonstrating synonymous usage).
236
See MIAMI-DADE EXPERIENCE, supra note 198, at 8 (“There is some evidence to
support the proposition that lobbyists receive exorbitant fees either in the form of hefty
retainers or in the form of success fees.”).
237
Cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Resp., Formal Op. 94-389 (1994) (“[T]he
charging of a contingent fee, in personal injury and in all other permissible types of
litigation, as well as in numerous non-litigation matters, does not violate ethical standards
as long as the fee is appropriate in the circumstances and reasonable in amount.”).
238
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 35 cmt. b (2000)
(“Contingent-fee arrangements . . . enable persons who could not otherwise afford
counsel to assert their rights, paying their lawyers only if the assertion succeeds.”);
Vincent R. Johnson and Virginia Coyle, On the Transformation of the Legal Profession:
The Advent of Temporary Lawyering, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 359, 393 (1990).
239
See Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (stating that in Texas “[a]bout 30 of the
1,700 lobbyists work for consumer and environmental groups, according to Texans for
Pubic Justice”).
240
See Scharrer, supra note 43 (“[T]he interests of low income children and
nonprofit institutions often lose out when they collide with money players in the state
Capitol, where companies with deep pockets hire high-powered lobbyists to protect their
interests.”). See also Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Clients’ Rewards Keep K Street Lobbyists
Thriving, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Birnbaum, Clients’ Rewards]
(“Congressional critics complain that average voters are left out when private lobbyists
rush in.”).
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lobbying is where the most money can be made.241 One recent change in
the tax laws, resulting from aggressive lobbying, saved sixty companies
the breathtaking sum of “roughly $100 billion.”242 There is little reason
to think that contingent-fee lobbying would benefit the poor243 or reduce
the disparities between “haves” and “have nots.”244
Numerous court decisions have condemned lobbyists’ contingent
fees.245 For example, more than 130 yeas ago in Trist v. Child,246 the
Supreme Court held that a contingent-fee agreement to lobby a private
bill through Congress was void and unenforceable.247 Justice Swayne’s
opinion for the Court condemned lobbying generally,248 and contingent-

241
Another reason may be that lobbying by non-profit organizations historically
was limited by provisions in the Internal Revenue Code granting tax-free status. See 26
U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (stating restriction); see also BERRY, supra note 40, at 47 (discussing
how nonprofit organizations cope with the restrictions on lobbying, for example by
telling their constituents to contact their legislators, but “refraining from telling them to
urge their legislators to vote in a particular way”). However, since 1976, “tax-deductible
nonprofits have [had] the option of the ‘H’ election, allowing them to ignore the
‘substantial’ limitation on lobbying.” Id. at 54. Thus, there are really two federal policies
on lobbying by nonprofits: “one policy sharply restricts lobbying; the other allows for
virtually unlimited lobbying.” Id. “The IRS has made it remarkably easy for a nonprofit
to take the H election.” Id. at 56. Yet, “[m]ost nonprofits have no idea that there is such a
thing as the H election, and only about 2.5 percent . . . choose this path.” Id. at 57.
242
Birnbaum, Clients’ Rewards, supra note 240 (indicating that the corporations
spent $1.6 million dollars on lobbying efforts).
243
But see Stacie L. Fatka & Jason Miles Levien, Note, Protecting the Right to
Petition: Why a Lobbying Contingency Fee Prohibition Violates the Constitution, 35
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 559, 587 (1998) (arguing that bans on contingent-fee lobbying often
preclude individuals and organizations with few financial resources from lobbying).
244
See David Westphal, Gap Between Rich and Poor Looks to Be Widening,
FRESNO BEE, Jan. 27, 2006, at A10 (discussing income inequality).
245
See, e.g., Grover v. Merritt Dev. Co., 47 F. Supp. 309, 319 (D.C. Minn. 1942)
(holding that a contingent fee lobbying agreement was against public policy, malum in se,
and void, and that no recovery could be had either for amount of fee or on a quantum
meruit basis).
246
88 U.S. 441 (1874).
247
Id. at 452; but see Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 276 (1880)
(distinguishing an impermissible contingent fee from a permissible percentage fee
established by the “custom of commission merchants and brokers”).
248
The agreement in the present case was for the sale of the influence and
exertions of the lobby agent to bring about the passage of a law for the
payment of a private claim, without reference to its merits, by means which,
if not corrupt, were illegitimate, and considered in connection with the
pecuniary interest of the agent at stake, contrary to the plainest principles of
public policy. . . . If any of the great corporations of the country were to hire
adventurers who make market of themselves in this way, to procure the
passage of a general law with a view to the promotion of their private
interests, the moral sense of every right-minded man would instinctively
denounce the employer and employed as steeped in corruption, and the
employment as infamous.
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fee lobbying in particular, regardless of whether there was evidence of
actual abuse.249 “Where the avarice of the agent is inflamed by the hope
of a reward contingent upon success, and to be graduated by a percentage
upon the amount appropriated, the danger of tampering in its worst form
is greatly increased.”250 Other Supreme Court cases have held that
“[c]ontingent fee contracts to secure Government business for the
employer of the recipient are invalid because of their tendency to induce
improper solicitation of public officers and the exercise of political
pressure.”251
However, “there are no modern federal cases dealing with
contingency fee lobbying.”252 While Trist and related cases253 have not
been overruled, some have expressed doubt about their continuing
validity.254 Congress’ recent failure to enact a ban on contingent-fee
Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441, 451 (1874).
249
No one has a right, in such circumstances, to put himself in a position of
temptation to do what is regarded as so pernicious in its character. The law
forbids the inchoate step, and puts the seal of its reprobation upon the
undertaking . . . The elder agent in this case is represented to have been a
lawyer of ability and high character . . . This can make no difference as to the
legal principles we have considered.
Id. at 451–53.
250
Id. at 452.
251
Muschany v. U.S., 324 U.S. 49, 64 (1945). See also Crocker v. United States,
240 U.S. 74, 78–79 (1916) (finding that there was “an obvious departure from recognized
legal and moral standards” where a company employed an agent with “compensation
contingent upon success, to secure the contract for furnishing . . . satchels” to the federal
government. Because of their baneful tendency . . . [such] agreements . . . are deemed
inconsistent with sound morals and public policy, and therefore invalid”).
252
Capps, supra note 40, at 1890.
253
See e.g., Marshall v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 57 U.S. 314, 336 (1853) (“[A]ll
contracts for a contingent compensation for obtaining legislation, or to use personal or
any secret or sinister influence on legislators, [are] void by the policy of the law.”). In
Providence Tool Co. v. Norris, a case involving a procurement contract, Justice Stephen
Field wrote for the Court:
Legislation should be prompted solely from considerations of the public
good, and the best means of advancing it. Whatever tends to divert the
attention of legislators from their high duties, to mislead their judgments, or
to substitute other motives for their conduct than the advancement of the
public interests, must necessarily and directly tend to impair the integrity of
our political institutions. Agreements for compensation contingent upon
success, suggest the use of sinister and corrupt means for the accomplishment
of the end desired. The law meets the suggestion of evil, and strikes down the
contract from its inception. There is no real difference in principle between
agreements to procure favors from legislative bodies, and agreements to
procure favors in the shape of contracts from the heads of departments.
69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 45, 54–55 (1864)
254
See Florida League of Prof’l Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 458 (11th
Cir. 1996) (discussing arguments that “interim developments of First Amendment law
establish conclusively that the Supreme Court today would strike a contingency-fee ban
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lobbying255 led one law review article to conclude that “lobbyists are still
free to receive contingency fees for lobbying members of Congress.”256
However, “[m]ost states prohibit the payment of fees contingent on the
outcome of legislation and or administrative action.”257 The same is true
of many cities.258
Yet, in other contexts no such action has been taken.259 This void
represents an opportunity for strengthening the rules governing the
conduct of lobbyists. It is bad enough that lobbying firms sometimes
solicit clients “with virtual guarantees that they . . . [can] deliver ‘dollars
for pennies’ (or billions for millions).”260 There is no need to add
contingency fee incentives to the mix. When challenged, almost all bans
on contingent-fee lobbying have been found to be constitutional.261
6. Business Transactions with and Employment by Lobbyists
Business transactions represent another means by which public
officials and employees can become indebted to lobbyists. “[F]ormer
House speaker James Wright was routinely paid huge sums of money for
speaking to lobbyists, who covered the expense by ‘buying’ signed

on lobbying”).
255
See Capps, supra note 40, at 1888 (“[N]one of the proposed legislation has
passed.”).
256
Id.
257
Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 667. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 86205(f)
(West 2005) (providing that no lobbyist or lobbying firm shall “[a]ccept or agree to
accept any payment in any way contingent upon the defeat, enactment, or outcome of any
proposed legislative or administrative action”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 97-5
(LexisNexis 2003) (stating a similar rule). “The following states are currently silent on
the issue: Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, and Wyoming. A couple of
states (Tennessee and West Virginia) require special disclosure or written agreements for
contingent fee lobbying. Delaware limits such fees to no more than half the compensation
paid to a lobbyist.” Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 667. See generally LOBBYING, PACS,
AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE, supra note 3 (detailing restrictions on contingent-fee lobbying,
state by state).
258
See MIAMI, FLA., CHARTER AND CODE OF THE CITY OF MIAMI, § 2-658 (2006)
(“No person shall retain or employ a lobbyist for compensation based on a contingency
fee.”); see also Rome v. Upton, 648 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that
a state ban on contingent fee lobbying extended to city councils).
259
See Capps, supra note 40, at 1887 (“Contingency fee lobbying contracts have
become surprisingly common” and “the media has uncovered various examples at the
state and local levels.”).
260
See Rudoren & Pilhofer, supra note 51, at 14.
261
See Meggs, 87 F.3d at 458 (upholding a ban on “contingency-fee lobbying
despite whatever doubts recent cases may have cast on its constitutionality”); Capps,
supra note 40, at 1891 (“[State bans] have generally withstood constitutional challenge in
the courts.”). But see Montana Auto. Ass’n v. Greely, 632 P.2d 300, 308 (Mont. 1981)
(striking down a ban on contingency-fee lobbying as overbroad).
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copies of his book for all of their members.”262 Such transactions create
an appearance of impropriety, threaten to bias public officials in favor of
the lobbyist’s clients, and generally compromise the goal of a level
playing field in public life. Such ethical problems are exacerbated when
the transaction involves payment of an amount in excess of fair market
value. One newspaper reported that a city councilman offered his vanitypress Frankenstein sequel for $500 per autographed copy, and that an
appreciative lobbyist paid that amount.263 Indiana, quite sensibly, bars
state officers and employees from receiving compensation for “the sale
or lease of any property or service which substantially exceeds that
which ... [he or she] would charge in the ordinary course of business.”264
Despite the obvious problems associated with business transactions
between lobbyists and public servants, various obstacles stand in the way
of crafting an effective ban on fair-market-value transactions. For
example, a member of a city council may also own a coffee shop. Should
it be impermissible for a lobbyist who represents clients before the city
council to patronize that member’s coffee shop occasionally? What if the
lobbyist patronizes the coffee shop every day, or recruits his or her
clients and their friends to do business at the establishment? A rule
banning de minimis business transactions probably serves no good
purpose, but differentiating those purchases from ones that are
objectionable is difficult. One possible approach would be to exclude
“routine” transactions,265 or transactions that do not create an appearance
of impropriety. However, such vague distinctions may be subject to
challenge on the ground that they fail to provide clear notice of what is

262

See BGA INTEGRITY INDEX, supra note 101, at 25.
See Chris Williams, Frankenstein Sequel Ready, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
Sept. 23, 1999, at 7B (describing the book written by city councilman Mario Salas); Chris
Williams, Contribution to Book Questioned, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 23,
1999, at 1B (stating that a lobbyist’s contribution to publication of a city councilman’s
novel “raised red flags among government ethicists and even other lobbyists”); Chris
Williams, Salas Ruling Questioned: City Attorney “Missed the Ball,” SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 28, 1999, at 1A (questioning an ethics opinion finding that the
book-publishing deal did not violate the city ethics code).
264
IND. CODE ANN. § 4-2-6-7(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2006).
265
Other areas of the law have addressed similar drafting problems. Some ethics
codes prohibit public officials from taking official action that affects the economic
interests of a “client,” and provide that “[t]he term client includes business relationships
of a highly personalized nature, but not ordinary business-customer relationships.” See
SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-43 (2006). Under
that type of provision, routine transactions fall outside the scope of the rule. “[A] city
official who owns a coffee shop would not have to abstain from participation in a matter
relating to one of the many hundreds of customers who occasionally buy a cup of coffee
at the shop because the relationship is not ‘highly personalized.’” See Johnson, Ethics in
Government, supra note 69, at 770 n. 255.
263
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prohibited.266
If it is problematic for public servants to engage in business
transactions with lobbyists, it is even worse for them to be on a lobbyist’s
payroll. In Oregon, a now-former Speaker of the House announced,
“almost a year before his legislative term would end, that he would not
seek re-election and that he had accepted a job with the nurserymen’s
group.”267 Although the Speaker assured the public that he would “not
lobby the legislature on issues that concerned the . . . [group] while he
remained in office,” he attended candidate endorsement meetings as a
representative of the group, [while] the Oregon legislature continued to
assemble” under the Speaker’s leadership.268 In a second Oregon case,
another former Speaker of the House “started a lobbying firm and
introduced legislation on behalf of his new clients before he left
office.”269
Sound principles of government ethics hold that public
representatives should be prohibited from engaging in outside
employment that conflicts with official duties.270 Legislators should not
266
Compare People v. Moore, 85 Misc. 2d 4 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1975) (finding an ethics
rule that barred receipt of gifts by a public official “under circumstances in which it could
reasonably be inferred that the gift was intended to influence him, or could reasonably be
expected to influence him, . . . or was intended as a reward” was unconstitutionally
vague), with Merrin v. Town of Kirkwood, 369 N.Y.S. 2d 878, 881 (App. Div. 1975)
(upholding disciplinary action under a similar rule).
267
Jeni L. Lassell, Comment, The Revolving Door: Should Oregon Restrict Former
Legislators from Becoming Lobbyists?, 82 OR. L. REV. 979, 979 (2003).
268
Id. at 979–80.
269
Id. at 980.
270
See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(10) (2006) (providing that federal executive branch
employees “shall not engage in outside employment or activities, including seeking or
negotiating for employment, that conflict with official Government duties and
responsibilities”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.29, § 5806(b)(1)–(4) (2003) (providing that no
state officer or employee “shall accept other employment …. which …. may result in …
(1) Impairment of independence of judgment in the exercise of official duties; (2) An
undertaking to give preferential treatment to any person; (3) The making of a
governmental decision outside official channels; or (4) Any adverse effect on the
confidence of the public in the integrity of the government”); CODE OF ETHICS OF THE
CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-48 (barring “concurrent outside employment which could
reasonably be expected to impair independence of judgment in, or faithful performance
of, official duties”). See generally Johnson, America’s Preoccupation, supra note 73, at
738 (discussing conflicting outside employment). Some codes restrict and discourage
legislators from working as lobbyists at other levels of government. See e.g., CODE OF
ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-67(h) (prohibiting members of the city council
from lobbying the Texas legislature when a session is pending or impending and stating
that “[a]t any other time, the City of San Antonio strongly discourages members of the
City Council and their spouses, agents and employees from lobbying before the Texas
Legislature”); see also id. at § 2-67(g) (prohibiting members of the Texas Legislature
from lobbying the city council when a session of the legislature is pending or impending
and stating that “[a]t any other time, the City of San Antonio strongly discourages
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be permitted to work simultaneously for a lobbyist if the interests of the
lobbyist’s clients could be affected by the official actions of the
legislator. Yet, some states fail to prohibit such arrangements. Colorado
merely requires the legislator to file a statement disclosing the
employment and the amount being paid.271 Kentucky expressly allows a
legislator’s spouse to work for a lobbyist, although usually not in a
lobbying capacity.272 Other states have enacted conditional bans which
address problems created by simultaneous outside employment. In
Kansas, “[n]o lobbyist shall offer employment or employ any state
officer or employee or associated person thereof for a representation
case, with intent to obtain improper influence over a state agency.”273 In
Iowa, House and Senate rules prohibit lobbyists “from offering economic
or investment opportunit[ies] or promise[s] of employment to Senators
and Representatives with intent to influence the performance of the
legislator’s duties.”274 City ethics codes commonly contain provisions
requiring public servants to recuse themselves from participation in any
official action that affects the economic interests of the outside employer.
275

members of the Texas Legislature and their spouses, agents and employees from
lobbying before the City of San Antonio”). These provisions were passed because a
“part-time state legislator acting as a lobbyist before the city” tried to use “the prestige of
his state office for the benefit of private interests.” Johnson, Virtues and Limits of Codes,
supra note 102, at 42.
271
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-306 (2005) (“If any person who engages in lobbying
employs or causes his employer to employ any member of the general assembly, any
member of a rule-making board or commission, any rule-making official of a state
agency, any employee of the general assembly, or any full-time state employee who
remains in the partial employ of the state or any agency thereof, the new employer shall
file a statement . . . . The statement shall specify the nature of the employment, the name
of the individual to be paid thereunder, and the amount of pay or consideration to be paid
thereunder.”).
272
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.626(2) (West 2004) (“Nothing in this code shall
preclude . . . [a] legislator’s spouse from being employed in some other capacity than a
legislative agent [lobbyist] by the employer of a legislative agent.”).
273
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-273(a) (2000) (emphasis added). “‘Representation case’
means the representation of any person, . . . with compensation, in any matter before any
state agency . . . [involving] the exercise of substantial discretion.” Id. at § 46-226.
Kansas law further provides that “[n]o lobbyist shall offer employment or employ any
state officer or employee or associated person to use or attempt to use threat or promise
of official action in an attempt to influence a state agency in any representation case.” Id.
at § 46-273(b) (emphasis added).
274
LOBBYING, PACS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE, supra note 3, at § 17.32 (emphasis
added).
275
See CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-43(a)(5) (stating that a
city official or employee must refrain from official action affecting the economic interests
of “the outside employer of the official or employee or of his or her parent, child . . .,
spouse, or [a] member of the household”).
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7. Reciprocal Favors
Basic principles of good government suggest that official power
should not be used to unfairly advance or impede private interests.276
That rule is sometimes expressly set out in city or state ethics codes.277
These codes provide that a public servant shall “not enter into an
agreement or understanding with any other person that official action by
the official or employee will be rewarded or reciprocated by the other
person, directly or indirectly.”278 In addition, municipal ethics codes 279
and other laws280 often state that a public official or employee shall not
take official action that supports the economic interests of a person with
whom that official or employee is negotiating to secure subsequent
employment. These are sound principles upon which to base the conduct
of public affairs. Presumably, they should apply even when—or perhaps
especially when—the reciprocal favor would be traded with a lobbyist,
or when the subsequent employment would be arranged by a lobbyist.
Nevertheless, startling departures from these sound principles
abound. In one recent case, a member of the United States Senate was
criticized for regularly meeting with lobbyists at the Capitol. At the end
of these meetings, a national political committee would distribute “lists
of Washington-based lobbying job-openings and [discuss] which . . .
276
Johnson, Ethics in Government, supra note 69, at 732–34 (discussing unfair
advancement of private interests).
277
CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-44(b) (“A city official or
employee may not use his or her official position to unfairly advance or impede private
interests, or to grant or secure, or attempt to grant or secure, for any person (including
himself or herself) any form of special consideration, treatment, exemption, or advantage
beyond that which is lawfully available to other persons.”). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
29, § 5806(b)(2) (2003) (providing that no state officer or employee “shall accept . . . (2)
An undertaking to give preferential treatment to any person”).
278
CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-44(b)(2) (prohibiting
reciprocal favors); see also DALLAS, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS § 12A-4(b)(3) (2006) (stating
a similar prohibition). Such provisions may be idealistic in the sense that “[r]eciprocity is
one of the strongest embedded norms in public life.” Thurber, supra note 12, at 153. But
that does not mean that such laws are ill-advised principles for the conduct of
government.
279
See, e.g., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-43 (“[A] city official
or employee shall not take any official action that he or she knows is likely to affect the
economic interests of . . . a person or business entity with whom, within the past twelve
months . . . the official or employee, or his or her spouse, directly or indirectly has . . .
solicited an offer of employment for which the application is still pending, . . . received
an offer of employment which has not been rejected, or . . . accepted an offer of
employment.”).
280
At the federal level, executive branch and congressional employees must
normally recuse themselves from matters affecting “any person or organization with
whom … [they are] negotiating or … [have] any arrangement concerning prospective
employment.” 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2006).
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congressional aides and former lawmakers [were] best suited for those
jobs.”281 Even though the Senator in question stated publicly that, “he
would end his regular meetings,” he merely moved them to a location
away from the Capitol, “at the same time and on the same day of the
week.”282
8. Lobbying by Closely Related Persons
There is an obvious appearance of impropriety when a public
servant is lobbied by a close family member, who is acting on behalf of a
third party.283 In such circumstances, it appears to observers that the
family member is selling access to the public servant. This harms public
confidence in government almost as much as if the public official
personally charged petitioners for the privilege of being heard.
Harm to confidence in government can also occur when an elected
representative dates a lobbyist who is representing private clients on
matters for which the representative has official responsibility. This
problem is not new. Members of “the gentle sex” were employed as
lobbyists in the late 1880s with instructions to win the votes of
congressmen, or at least “keep them away from the House when the . . .
[bills were] voted upon.”284 More recently, one member of Congress
“tried to insert language into the Homeland Security Act to help Philip
Morris tobacco while dating the company’s lobbyist.”285
Some lobbying firms also “openly hire the friends of a particular
member in order to get the legislator’s ear.”286 At times in American
history, the “widows or daughters of former congressmen” have been
employed to exert their influence with designated congressmen.287 In
addition, legislative staff members often move on to lobbying firms after

281

Id.
Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Charles Babington, Senator Resumes Lobbyist Huddles;
Santorum Suspended Sessions, WASH. POST., Mar. 9, 2006, at A4.
283
See Rudoren & Pilhofer, supra note 51, at 14 (discussing how employing a
lobbying firm where the daughter of a transportation committee member was an associate
resulted in a meeting “the next day”); see also Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Panel Endorses
More Information on Lobbyist Contacts, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2006 [hereinafter
Birnbaum, Panel Endorses] (discussing a proposed law approved by the Senate Rules
Committee that would “bar the relatives of any senator from lobbying that senator’s
staff”); GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 694–95 (“Linda Daschle, the wife of Senate
Minority Leader Tom Daschle, . . . [who] lobbied successfully for clients in
transportation-related industries in the late 1990s . . . took a personal oath to avoid
lobbying the Senate when she became a lobbyist in 1997.”).
284
REMINI, supra note 56, at 239.
285
Mills, supra note 191.
286
GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 697.
287
REMINI, supra note 56, at 239.
282
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leaving the public sector.288 These problems relating to privileged access
are sometimes susceptible to legal solutions. A rule banning lobbying by
“friends” would be unenforceably vague and unworkable. However,
provisions prohibiting lobbying by relatives or former staffers could be
written in sufficiently specific terms that would pass constitutional
muster.
Although Congress has not addressed these problems,289 some states
prevent persons closely connected to public servants from being used by
lobbyists to gain an unfair advantage in petitioning the government.
Arizona prohibits all persons from “improperly seek[ing] to influence the
vote of any member of the legislature through communication with that
member’s employer.”290 Other states have similar provisions.291
Some municipalities have also enacted rules providing that a city
official or employee must refrain from official action affecting the
economic interests of “his or her parent, child, spouse, or other [close]
family member.”292 These rules apply where the economic interest being
advanced is that of “the outside employer of the official[‘s] . . . parent,
child . . ., spouse, or [a] member of the household.”293 These provisions
presumably require the public servant to recuse himself or herself from
participation in any matter that would economically benefit in a special
way294 a client of a family member-lobbyist or a client of the lobbying
firm that employs the family member.
9. Lobbyists as Campaign Treasurers, Consultants, and Staff
A variety of cozy relationships between lobbyists and candidates or
officeholders have become prevalent in recent years. In some cases,
candidates sometimes select lobbyists to serve as campaign treasurers295

288
See McIntire, supra note 199 (noting that ten of the House majority leader’s
“former staff members have gone to work for lobbying firms, and his former chief of
staff . . . is married to a lobbyist”).
289
See Ethics Fencing in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2007, at A14 (opining
that in discussing reform of the ethics rules relating to lobbyists, “Senators ducked a
worthy amendment that would bar members from putting family members on campaign
payrolls, or see kin become lobbyists”).
290
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1233(3) (2004).
291
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-302 (2005) (prohibiting persons from seeking
influence “through communication with the legislator’s employer”).
292
SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-43(a)(2)
(2006).
293
Id. at § 2-43(a)(5).
294
Id. at § 2-43(c)(1) (“An action is likely to affect an economic interest if it is
likely to have an effect on that interest that is distinguishable from its effect on members
of the public in general or a substantial segment thereof.”).
295
See Stephen Koff, Outrage Over Abramoff Case Belies Lobbyists’ Place in
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or in other campaign positions.296 These relationships send the message
that advancing a client’s interests depends more upon campaign money
than upon the merits of the matter in question.297 Quite sensibly, some
states bar lobbyists from serving in a fundraising capacity.298 The
rationale underlying these regulations is a desire to counteract the threat
that fundraising lobbyists will crowd other voices out of the debate.
Moreover, lobbyists are supposed to aid the legislative process by
bringing “information to law makers, who often have small staffs that are
young and insufficiently paid.”299 Where the focus is predominantly on
fundraising, cogent arguments about the merits become less important.300

Politics, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 22, 2006, at A20 (discussing lobbyists hired as
campaign treasurers), available at 2006 WLNR 1216376 (Westlaw).
296
See McIntire, supra note 199 (stating that the House majority leader’s “campaign
committees recently hired two people from lobbying groups for the financial and
insurance industries”).
297
See Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (quoting an unnamed Texas lobbyist as
stating that “[t]he system has changed in the last few years. . . . [Issues] matter less now
than ever before because . . . a small group of clients with a tremendous amount of money
control the system”).
298
The Alaska statute, for example, provides that a lobbyist may not:
serve as a campaign manager or director, serve as a campaign treasurer or
deputy campaign treasurer on a finance or fund-raising committee, host a
fund-raising event, directly or indirectly collect contributions for, or deliver
contributions to, a candidate, or otherwise engage in the fund-raising activity
of a legislative campaign or campaign for governor or lieutenant governor . .
.; this paragraph does not apply to a representational lobbyist as defined in
the regulations of the Alaska Public Offices Commission, and does not
prohibit a lobbyist from making personal contributions to a candidate . . . or
personally advocating on behalf of a candidate.
ALASKA STAT. § 24-45.121(a)(8) (2004). Under the referenced regulations,
“‘[r]epresentational lobbyist’ means that the individual is not employed by the person or
group on whose behalf he is lobbying and receives no salary, fee, retainer, or any
economic consideration whatsoever, other than reimbursement of travel and personal
living expenses, for his services as a lobbyist.” Ak. Pub. Offices Comm’n, Reg. 2 AAC
50.511 (2006). See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4144 (2000) (“No person who is
registered as a lobbyist . . . shall be eligible for appointment as treasurer for any candidate
or candidate committee.”); KY. REV. STAT. § 6.811(5) (West 2004) (“A legislative agent
[lobbyist] shall not serve as a campaign treasurer, or as a fundraiser . . . [of more than
$3,000 in a jurisdiction with more than 200,000 people] for a candidate or legislator.”);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-8.1(A) (LexisNexis 2004) (“No lobbyist may serve as a
campaign chairman, treasurer or fundraising chairman for a candidate for the legislature
or a statewide office.”).
299
See Scharrer, supra note 43 (discussing Texas).
300
Guy Taylor, Lobbying Scandal Heightens Scrutiny, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006,
at A1 (quoting a Georgetown University professor as stating that the “fixation on
campaign funds, dramatically has changed the tenor on Capitol Hill; . . . I had a corporate
lobbyist tell me recently that his job wasn’t much fun anymore . . . that he didn’t feel that
he needed to muster complicated arguments, just round up contributions for the
majority”).
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This is also true where the fundraising involves not the public official’s
campaign, but charities and other private institutions favored by the
official. Some states expressly prohibit lobbyists from engaging “in any
charitable fund-raising activity at the request of an official or
employee.”301 Other states have more flexible rules. For example,
Kentucky allows legislators and candidates to solicit contributions “on
behalf of charitable, civic, or educational entities provided the
solicitations are broad-based and are not directed solely or primarily at
legislative agents [i.e., lobbyists].”302
Some lobbying groups also provide campaign “consultants” to
candidates. Those consultants can ultimately play a “key part in access
and lobbying battles after candidates become elected public officials.”303
For this reason, it becomes “hard to tell where lobbying end[s] and
public service beg[ins].”304 Astute observers of government rightfully ask
whether it is “ethical to have reciprocal relationships among consultants,
lobbyists, and public officials [where] those alliances are not transparent
and . . . seem to go against the public interest.”305
In certain cases, officeholders select lobbyists to serve as a chief of
staff306 or in other trusted positions.307 These arrangements allow
officials to take advantage of “having an unpaid lobbyist in the back
room where the decisions . . . [are] being made.”308 In some states there
are laws prohibiting lobbyists from serving “as . . . member[s] of a state
board or commission, if the lobbyist’s employer may receive direct
economic benefit from a decision of that board or commission.”309
Although these laws are not violated in cases of executive and legislative
staff appointments, the ethical lesson is clear. The interests of good
government are best served when there is some distance between
301
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 15-713(10) (LexisNexis 2004) (“including
soliciting, transmitting the solicitation of, or transmitting a charitable contribution”).
302
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.626(1) (emphasis added).
303
See Thurber, supra note 12, at 151.
304
Revolting Door, supra note 209 (discussing lobbying in Washington, D.C.).
305
See Thurber, supra note 12, at 154.
306
See Scharrer, supra note 43, at 10A (stating that the governor of Texas hired as
his chief of staff a man who had lobbied for the tobacco industry and who subsequently
“returned to his lucrative lobbying business”).
307
See Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (discussing a Texas lobbyist who was
tapped by the state House speaker to join his “transition team” thus becoming “in essence
a government insider for a few months, while keeping his day job representing big money
clients”); Revolting Door, supra note 209 (discussing a lobbyist who was appointed as
the Interior Department’s secretary and then left public service to return to the private
sector as a lobbyist).
308
Scharrer, supra note 43.
309
ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(a)(7) (2004); see also MO. ANN. STAT. § 105-967
(West 2006) (prohibiting lobbyists from serving on certain commissions).
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lobbyists and the exercise of official power.
One way to address these types of problems is to bar elected
officials from voting on issues involving lobbyists who served as
campaign consultants. Good ethics codes normally preclude public
officials or employees from taking official action that would
economically benefit themselves or any closely connected person or
entity.310 A campaign consultant who is or becomes a lobbyist is
connected to a public official by a relationship so important in nature that
the public interest would be best served by requiring the official or
employee to step aside and allow others to act on the matter in
question.311 The City and County of San Francisco currently prohibit
310

For example, San Antonio’s code of ethics provides:
(a) General Rule. To avoid the appearance and risk of impropriety, a city
official or employee shall not take any official action that he or she knows is
likely to affect the economic interests of:
(1) the official or employee;
(2) his or her parent, child, spouse, or other family member within the
second degree of consanguinity or affinity;
(3) his or her outside client;
(4) a member of his or her household;
(5) the outside employer of the official or employee or of his or her
parent, child . . ., spouse, or member of the household . . . ;
(6) a business entity in which the official or employee knows that any
of the persons listed in Subsections (a)(1) or (a)(2) holds an economic
interest . . . ;
(7) a business entity which the official or employee knows is an
affiliated business or partner of a business entity in which any of the
persons listed in Subsections (a)(1) or (a)(2) holds an economic interest
as defined in Section 2-42;
(8) a business entity or nonprofit entity for which the city official or
employee serves as an officer or director or in any other policy making
position; or
(9) a person or business entity with whom, within the past twelve
months:
(A) the official or employee, or his or her spouse, directly or
indirectly has
(i) solicited an offer of employment for which the
application is still pending,
(ii) received an offer of employment which has not been
rejected, or
(iii) accepted an offer of employment; or
(B) the official or employee, or his or her spouse, directly or
indirectly engaged in negotiations pertaining to business
opportunities, where such negotiations are pending or not
terminated.
SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-43(a) (2006). See
also DALLAS, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS § 12A-3 (2006) (stating a similar rule).
311
To be effective, recusal must be carefully choreographed. See, e.g., CODE OF
ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-43(b) (providing that a city official or employee
with a conflict of interest “shall: (1) immediately refrain from further participation in the
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campaign consultants from communicating with officers of the city and
county who are their current or previous clients.312
10. Make-Work Legislative Proposals
Many states prohibit lobbyists from introducing legislation solely
for the purpose of securing future employment either to ensure the law’s
passage or defeat.313 Such limitations share a common objective with
ethics rules314 and other laws315 that prohibit attorneys and their clients
from engaging in frivolous litigation. The goal in both of these contexts
is to avoid wasting valuable public and private resources on initiatives
that do not further legitimate purposes.
B. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
Lobbyist rules typically rely heavily on disclosure. The federal
Lobbyist Disclosure Act, 316 for example, requires lobbyists to register317
and file periodic activity reports.318 Disclosure regimes endeavor to
expose to public scrutiny the identity of persons seeking to influence
official decisions and how much money is being spent on their efforts.319
matter, including discussions with any persons likely to consider the matter; and (2)
promptly file with the City Clerk the appropriate form for disclosing the nature and extent
of the prohibited conduct” and in addition “(3) a supervised employee shall promptly
bring the conflict to the attention of his or her supervisor, who will then, if necessary,
reassign responsibility for handling the matter to another person; and (4) a member of a
board shall promptly disclose the conflict to other members of the board and shall not be
present during the board’s discussion of, or voting on, the matter”).
312
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., CAMPAIGN AND GOVERNMENTAL CONDUCT CODE § 2.117
(2006) (providing, with certain exceptions, that “[n]o campaign consultant, individual
who has an ownership interest in the campaign consultant, or an employee of the
campaign consultant shall communicate with any officer of the City and County who is a
current or former client of the campaign consultant on behalf of another person or entity
(other than the City and County) in exchange for economic consideration for the purpose
of influencing local legislative or administrative action”).
313
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(a)(4).
314
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003) (stating in part that a “lawyer
shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless
there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous”).
315
FED. R. CIV. PROC. 11 (2006) (requiring certification that a claim “is not being
presented . . . to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation”
and is “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument,” and allowing sanctions
against “the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated” the rule.).
316
2 U.S.C. §§ 1601–12 (2006).
317
Id. at § 1603 (detailing the registration process).
318
Id. at § 1604 (requiring semi-annual reports).
319
Cf. GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 692 (stating that the standard approach
to regulating lobbyists at the federal level has been to “‘monitor lobbyists’ activities and
reveal them publicly when they go too far”).
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At the state level, the scope of lobbyist disclosure obligations varies
widely.320 State laws may require disclosure of “fees paid to lobbyists,
matters lobbied, the names of employees or contractors [who do the]
lobbying, the total amount spent on lobbying, [and the nature of] gifts
made to public officials . . . .”321 Some cities have adopted similar
registration and disclosure regimes.322 However, many cities have no
such requirements.
Lobbying that occurs in the open is less objectionable than lobbying
that occurs behind closed doors. Statements made in public by lobbyists
can be scrutinized by others and challenged with competing facts and
arguments. The resulting public debate is consistent with a healthy
political process. In contrast, statements made by lobbyists that are
hidden from public view cannot easily be probed or disputed.
Consequently, inaccurate assertions may go uncontested. Lobbyist
disclosure requirements reflect these concerns. As a result, statements
made by lobbyists at public meetings,323 in publicly-available
documents,324 or through mass media325 are typically exempted from the
definition of what constitutes lobbying. Such activities, as well as
expenditures or income related thereto, normally do not need to be
revealed.
The expenditure of large amounts of money on lobbying poses risks
to good government. Beyond a certain point, expenditures suggest an
effort to overwhelm the facts through excessive spending.326 Some
lobbyist rules address this problem through disclosure regimes that come
into effect when client expenditures or lobbyist income on particular

320
See Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 667–68 (stating that “the amount and method
of disclosure varies widely state-to-state” and summarizing state registration and
reporting requirements).
321
See id. at 668.
322
See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO §§
2-62 to 2-71 (2006).
323
See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(B)(vii) (2006) (exempting from the definition of
“lobbying contact,” “testimony given before a committee, subcommittee, or task force of
the Congress, or submitted for inclusion in the public record of a hearing conducted by
such committee, subcommittee, or task force”).
324
See, e.g., id. at §§ 1602(8)(B)(xiv)–(xv) (exempting from the definition of
“lobbying contact” a communication that is “a written comment filed in the course of a
public proceeding or any other communication that is made on the record in a public
proceeding” or “a petition for agency action made in writing and required to be a matter
of public record”).
325
See, e.g., id. at § 1602(8)(B)(iii) (discussing communications made “through
radio, television, cable television, or other medium of mass communication”).
326
Cf. Still a Bad Deal, supra note 70 (discussing how an “army of lobbyists”
ensured that the House approved a deal with India “with minimal restrictions”).
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public issues reach a certain level.327 In other words, once the issues and
expenditures have been linked, the public can scrutinize the decisions
made by public servants and, if necessary, hold those actors accountable.
In spite of the apparent simplicity of this concept, it is difficult to
implement effectively for reasons related to regulatory complexity328 and
timely dissemination of information.329
1. Regulatory Complexity
Lobbyist disclosure regimes are necessarily complex due to the
multiple ways money is used to influence the resolution of public
issues.330 Some persons make expenditures directly without hiring
someone to act on their behalf. Other persons are represented by
lobbyists who are in-house staff members.331 Still other persons engage
327

From one perspective, identifying the issue—the purpose of the lobbying—
should not be difficult. Lobbyists are admonished to “[d]efine the issues in a lobbying
visit. Determine at the outset what you want.” See WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 43, at 20.
“Definition is crucial because of the relatively narrow temporal focus of legislators and
their staff.” Id. Yet, on another level, issue definition may be far less certain. A city ethics
code may define lobbying as efforts to influence the resolution of a “municipal question.”
See CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-62(h) (defining “lobbying”).
“Municipal question” may itself be defined, but that definition may be less than fully
satisfactory. See id. at § 2-62(j) (stating, in part, that “[t]he term ‘municipal question’
does not include the day-to-day application, administration, or execution of existing city
programs, policies, ordinances, resolutions, or practices, including matters that may be
approved administratively without consideration by a board, a commission, or the City
Council”). If a lobbyist represents a developer in seeking a variance of the treepreservation ordinance on property zoned for commercial use, is that activity “lobbying,”
and if so, is the issue that must be disclosed on the lobbyist registration and activity
reports “variance,” “zoning,” “tree ordinance,” or something else? If multiple lobbyists
represent multiple clients with respect to the same or similar matters, it is possible the
issue will be identified differently in the various filings, and that it will be difficult or
impossible for persons scrutinizing those filings to determine how much money was
spent by various clients to influence those issues. Presumably, issue identification by
legislative lobbyists can be simplified by reference to bill numbers, but those references
do not apply to non-legislative lobbying or legislative lobbying where a bill has yet to be
drafted.
328
See discussion infra subpart III.B.1.
329
See discussion infra subpart III.B.2.
330
Horn, supra note 3, at 51 (discussing lobbying by the “small to modestly sized
nonprofit organization”). Horn says there are three basic approaches: first, “hiring one or
more staff members . . . [to run] the group’s legislative or political operation”; second,
simply retaining a lobbyist when the need for legislative action arises; and third, joining a
“coalition of similarly situated or interested entities” that hire full-time staff or retains
lobbying professionals. Id. at 51.
331
See Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (“Most [lobbyists] work in house for a
single interest, like a corporation or a trade association. A smaller number of hired guns
hang a shingle outside an office and work for whoever hires them. Some work alone,
others in informal or formal partnerships.”).
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outside lobbyists, who either work alone, in small boutiques, or as part of
larger firms (such as law firms) which devote all or part of their time to
lobbying.332 Any effective regulatory regime must take account of all of
these types of lobbying. On the one hand, regulators must exercise care
not to omit relevant lobbying approaches from the registration and
reporting regime. To the extent that any such omissions could become
“loopholes” for lobbyists to exploit, they could bring the entire
disclosure regime into disrepute.333 On the other hand, a regime that
imposes strict requirements may trigger an excessive amount of
disclosure which, because of its abundance or possible inconsistency,
will obscure, rather than reveal important information. To avoid both
pitfalls, a properly drafted disclosure regime should embrace an
interlocking set of obligations and exemptions334 to ensure that the
disclosures required are not overly burdensome, yet capture all relevant
information. Not surprisingly, the challenge of defining who should
register and disclose information is more complex than might first
appear.335
Similar difficulties arise with respect to defining what type of
conduct constitutes “lobbying.”336 Disclosure laws typically incorporate
intricate formulations that exclude from the definition of “lobbying” the
activities of media outlets,337 churches,338 whistle blowers,339 persons
332
See Chwat, supra note 41, at 115–17 (discussing various types of lobbying firms,
including “one-stop shops,” “boutique” firms, and law firms).
333
See Johnson, Virtues and Limits of Codes, supra note 102, at 41 (“As far as a
regulatory document is concerned, no criticism so discredits its content as the charge that
the document contains ‘loopholes.’ Such allegations . . . call into question not merely the
substance of the enactment, but the competence of the drafters and the value of the
project at all.”).
334
See, e.g., San Antonio, Tex., Code of Ethics of the City of San Antonio § 2-64(g)
(2006) (granting an exemption from the registration and periodic filing requirements to
“[a]n agent or employee of a lobbying firm or other registrant that files a registration
statement or activity report for the period in question fully disclosing all relevant
information”).
335
See generally San Jose, Cal., San José Municipal Code §12.12.190 (2006)
(defining “contract” lobbyists, “in-house” lobbyists, and “expenditure” lobbyists).
336
Id. at § 12.12.80 (“‘Lobbying’ means influencing or attempting to influence a
city official or city official-elect with regard to a legislative or administrative action of
the city or redevelopment agency . . . . “Influencing” means the purposeful
communication, either directly or through agents, for the purpose of promoting,
supporting, modifying, opposing, causing the delay or abandonment of conduct, or
otherwise intentionally affecting the official actions of a city official or city official-elect,
by any means, including, but not limited to providing or using persuasion, information,
incentives, statistics, studies or analyses.”).
337
See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(b)(ii) (2006) (providing that the term “lobbying
contact” does not include communications “made by a representative of a media
organization if the purpose of the communication is gathering and disseminating news
and information to the public).
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responding to agency requests for public comment,340 individuals seeking
to resolve problems related to government benefits, employment, or
personal matters,341 certain governmental entities,342 and others.343 In
addition to direct contacts with government officials or employees, 344
disclosure laws regulate indirect or “grassroots” lobbying.345
Problems also arise with regard to the definition of “expenditures.”
For example, a law may be insufficiently specific in identifying which
expenditures must be reported. The federal Regulation of Lobbying Act
of 1946:
left it up to each group or its lobbyists to determine what
portion of total expenditures to report. As a result, some
organizations whose Washington office budgets ran into
the millions of dollars reported spending only very small
amounts on lobbying, contending that the remainder was
spent on research, general public information, and other
matters.346
Disclosure regimes that seek to trace the influence of money often
require disclosure of lobbyist compensation in order to measure the total
amount spent on a lobbying effort.347 However, such provisions may be
difficult or impossible to enact because legislative bodies may be
reluctant to require disclosure of lobbyists’ income. As a result, a wellcrafted reform proposal may be gutted by an amendment348 that strips a
338

See, e.g., id. § 1602(8)(b)(xviii) (discussing tax exempt entities and religious
entities).
339
See, e.g., id. § 1602(8)(b)(xvii) (discussing whistle blowers).
340
See, e.g., id. § 1602(8)(b)(x) (discussing notices published in the Federal
Register and other publications).
341
See, e.g., id. § 1602(8)(b)(xvi) (discussing matters “involving only that
individual”).
342
See, e.g., San Antonio, Tex., Code of Ethics of the City of San Antonio § 2-64(c)
(2006) (“provided the communications relate solely to subjects of governmental
interest”).
343
See, e.g., Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 665 (exemptions for bona fide
salespersons may apply to limitations on “procurement lobbying”).
344
See Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 666 (“All lobby laws capture ‘direct contacts’
with officials or employees.”)
345
Id. But see Code of Ethics of the City of San Antonio § 2-64(b) (exempting nonprofit entities seeking to mobilize constituents).
346
Guide to Congress, supra note 2, at 718.
347
See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1604(b)(3) (2006) (requiring “a good faith estimate of the
total amount of all income from the client”). Cf. Code of Ethics of the City of San
Antonio § 2-62(c) (defining compensation).
348
See Stephanie D. Campanella et al., supra note 226, at 139 (discussing an
amendment “deleting the section of . . . [a Georgia ethics] bill that would have required
the disclosure of lobbyists’ income”).
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proposed law of the ability to link dollars to issues. Other regulations
impose a duty to register and disclose only after a certain amount is spent
on lobbying.349 Ideally, that threshold should enable regulators to focus
on the “major players,” and to avoid ensnaring unwitting citizens.
However, opponents of reform efforts may seek to muddy the waters by
lowering the threshold so that the law generates a great deal of useless
information that will make it more burdensome for government
watchdogs to track the conduct of those who should be scrutinized.350
In addition, it is necessary to anticipate when dollars will be counted
to determine whether the registration threshold has been passed. If a
lobbyist is compensated with an hourly fee, but the money will not be
paid until two years have elapsed, when is compensation actually
received? Codes sometimes deal with this problem by providing that
“[c]ompensation which has not yet been received is considered to be
received on the date that it is earned, if that date is ascertainable;
otherwise, it is received on the date on which the contract . . . is made, or
on the date lobbying commences, whichever is first.”351 Similarly, if a
client offers to pay a lobbyist (a) $10 for pleading the client’s case to
members of the city council and (b) $10,000 for cutting the client’s lawn,
which amounts should be counted toward determining whether the
threshold has been surpassed? One possible solution is “[i]f a lobbyist
349

Under federal law, a lobbyist need not register with respect to a client if income
from the client does not exceed $5,000 or total expenditures on lobbying do not exceed
$20,000. 2 U.S.C. § 1603(a)(3)(A) (2006).
350
When the City of San Antonio, Texas, passed a new ethics code in November,
1998, a person who engaged in lobbying (broadly defined) was required to register only
if “(a) with respect to any client, the person engage[d] in lobbying activities for
compensation of more than one thousand dollars ($1000) in a calendar quarter; or (b) the
person expend[ed] more than one thousand dollars ($1000) for lobbying in a calendar
quarter.” An agitated citizen who buys two tickets to a $250-a-plate dinner for the
opportunity to button-hole the mayor about a particular municipal issue would not be
required to register. Subsequent to 1998, the San Antonio ethics code was amended so
that it now provides that “a person . . . who engages in lobbying must register . . . if: (a)
with respect to any client, the person or entity engages in lobbying activities for
compensation; or (b) the person or entity expends monies for lobbying activities.” SAN
ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-63 (2006). The
elimination of the $1000 threshold has numerous untoward consequences. The
hypothetical citizen who goes to the dinner to talk to the mayor has inadvertently violated
the ethics codes–which will anger and embarrass the citizen, and bring the code into
disrepute. The amendment requires more filings from “small time” lobbyists and makes it
harder to track the major players. And the change may discourage persons who are aware
of the sweep of the new rule from engaging in the type of civic involvement that no one
would really be much concerned about, and thereby protect the “turf” of big-time
lobbyists.
351
CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-62(c). The federal law is
framed in terms of compensation or expenditures that are “expected.” 2 U.S.C. §§
1603(a)(3)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006).
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engages in both lobbying activities and other activities . . ., compensation
for lobbying includes all amounts received . . ., if, for the purpose of
evading the . . . [rules], the lobbyist has structured the receipt of
compensation in a way that unreasonably minimizes the value of the
lobbying activities.”352
2. The Limits of Sunshine
An ethics reporting regime makes little sense unless someone
scrutinizes the content and truthfulness of the information that has been
disclosed.353 On occasion, the media unearths stunning omissions,
discrepancies, and outright falsehoods in lobbyists’ filings.354 However,
journalistic review of voluminous public documents is haphazard at best
given the limited resources of many newspapers and broadcasters, as
well as the distraction of other public events that command reporters’
attention. Moreover, while media outlets might scrutinize filings by
lobbyists at the federal and perhaps at the state level, at the local level,
there is often only one newspaper in the city. Aside from a paucity of
staff time to review tedious documents, there may be political and other
pressures that cause the sole newspaper in town to be less than
aggressive in reviewing lobbyists’ filings.
Public interest groups also play a role in scrutinizing lobbyists’
disclosures. Nonprofit organizations, such as the National Legal and
Policy Center, sometimes identify serious problems.355 But again, when
one looks at the various levels of government nationally, the process of
review is hit-or-miss.
“The oversight of lobby and gift laws differs by state, ranging from
aggressive, independent agencies dedicated to enforcement and
interpretation of lobby and/or gift laws to jurisdictions with almost no
enforcement.”356 In Texas, “the state agency in charge of monitoring
lobbyists has received 1,500 sworn complaints since its founding in 1992
. . . [but] has never conducted a complete audit or subpoenaed a single

352

CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-62(c).
Cf. GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 718 (stating that under a former federal
law requiring reports by lobbyists “the Justice Department eventually adopted a policy of
investigating [falsity, which was a crime,] only when it received complaints . . . . [T]here
were only six prosecutions between 1946 and 1980”).
354
Cf. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“[T]he
right to petition is subject to abuse and misuse and a vigilant press can expose abuses to
public view.”).
355
See Editorial, No Ethics in Congress without Enforcement, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 13, 2006, at 6B [hereinafter No Ethics] (discussing a complaint
filed with the U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia by the NLPC).
356
Nielsen, supra note 3, at 671.
353
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document, or subpoenaed and met with a witness in person.”357 At the
federal level,358 and in many states, independent enforcement of lobbyist
laws would be a great step forward. But legislators, not surprisingly, are
reluctant to fund such efforts. Montana addresses this concern by
allowing citizens to bring actions to enforce the lobbying rules if the
attorney general and other officials choose not to do so.359
One of the chief objections to disclosure regimes is that the
information often comes too late. Lobbyists do not file reports daily,
rather, they typically file on a semi-annual or quarterly basis.360 Thus, by
the time someone reviews the data, decisions have often been made
about the underlying issues and public debate has moved on to other
subjects. Oftentimes there is nothing more than a vague hope that when
information becomes public, busy citizens will learn things about the
past and remember to hold elected officials accountable at some point in
the future.

357
Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (“Since 1992, the [Texas Ethics
Commission] has initiated only one sworn complaint, has conducted one formal hearing
and has not forwarded a single case to a law enforcement agency for criminal
prosecution.”)
358
See Editorial, Ethical Notes on the Reforming Class, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2006,
at A14 (criticizing a Florida Congresswoman’s “bumbling attempts” to explain away a
$2,800 dinner for two with a defense contractor, despite a “$50 limit on feeding a
lawmaker,” and opining that “the real bottom line was that with no one enforcing ethical
rules in the House–hey, bon appétit”); see also No Ethics, supra note 355 (discussing
“why Congress can’t police itself”).
359
The Montana code provides:
Any individual who has notified the attorney general, the commissioner, and
the appropriate county attorney in writing that there is reason to believe that
some portion of this chapter is being violated may bring in the name of the
state an action . . . authorized under this chapter if: (i) the attorney general,
the commissioner, or the appropriate county attorney has failed to commence
an action within 90 days after notice; and (ii) the attorney general, the
commissioner, or the county attorney fails to commence an action within 10
days after receiving a written notice that a citizen's action will be brought if
the attorney general, the commissioner, or the county attorney does not bring
an action
MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-7-305(4) (2005). However, the incentives to bring a citizen’s
action are slight. “If the individual who brings the citizen’s action prevails, the individual
is entitled to be reimbursed by the state of Montana for costs and attorney fees incurred.
However, . . . [if the] action . . . is dismissed and . . . the court also finds [the case] was
brought without reasonable cause, the court may order the individual commencing the
action to pay all costs of trial and reasonable attorney fees incurred by the defendant.” Id.
at § 5-7-305(4)(c). In addition, “[a]ll civil penalties imposed pursuant to this section must
be deposited in the state general fund.” Id. at § 5-7-305(6).
360
See Birnbaum, Lobbyists, supra note 12 (discussing proposed legislation that
would “require lobbyists to file quarterly rather than the current biannual reports about
their activities as well as a new, once-a-year disclosure that would detail their donations
to federal candidates, officeholders and political parties”).
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“An increasing number of states require (or permit) disclosure of
lobbying activity by electronic means.”361 Improvements in on-line
filing362 and searchable databases, coupled with ethics-in-government
blogs,363 might help to close the gap between information collection and
accountability. However, even then there will be reason to question
whether the disclosure of practices that are potentially harmful to the
public interest is the best the law can do to ensure good government. As
one editorial lamented, a law that requires disclosure of gifts and
campaign money, rather than banning them entirely, is the equivalent of
posting of “price lists for the cost of doing business” with law makers.364
Another commentator remarked that, “disclosure laws have ‘legitimized
a form of official corruption’ [through publication].”365
IV. THE FUTURE OF LOBBYIST REGULATIONS
There is no shortage of news stories identifying weaknesses in the
rules that regulate lobbyists. The interesting thing is that if one looks at
the law nationally, for virtually every issue that someone can identify,
some legislature, somewhere, has passed a rule that effectively addresses
the problem, or has taken action that would assist reformers in crafting
appropriate solutions. Thus, the challenge in regulating lobbyists is not to
re-conceptualize the field or to develop radically innovative solutions,
but to employ the tools that are already available.
In recent years, the dominant approach has been to embrace
disclosure and sunshine. While no one suggests abandoning that
progress, there are limits as to what can be achieved by regimes that seek
to thrust masses of information on a citizenry too busy, distracted, or
simply unable to utilize that information. In many respects, legal
prohibitions that directly address bad practices offer a more efficient,
albeit sometimes overlooked,366 means for resolving problems related to
361

Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 668.
See Birnbaum, Lobbyists, supra note 12 (discussing a proposed federal measure
that “would mandate much more extensive use of the Internet in filing the new and
additional disclosures”). See also Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Online System for Disclosures
Frustrates Lobbyists, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2006 (discussing glitches in an online filing
system for lobbyists which was originally “hailed by lawmakers, lobbyists and
government watchdog groups as a boon to public disclosure” when it was adopted in
2005).
363
See Editorial, New Rules in Yonkers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, at WE15
(discussing an “acid-tongued” blogger seeking to expose “hidden outrages”).
364
Editorial, Now You See It, Now You Don’t, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2006 at WK 13.
365
See Plemmons, supra note 6, at 155 n.148 (quoting former White House counsel
John Dean).
366
For example, “Maine has permissive lobbying regulations, with few explicit
prohibitions.” LOBBYING, PACS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE, supra note 3, at § 21.34.
362
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lobbying. Banning harmful practices outright takes greater political
resolve than requiring disclosure. Yet, there is reason to think that with
respect to lobbying, progress can be made in the continuing quest for
ethics in government.

Similarly, in Wyoming, “regulation of lobbyists consists of registration and limited
financial disclosure . . . [and does not] describe specific prohibited practices.” Id. at §
52.31.

